Veto Players¶
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Checks and Balances
- Checks and balances do not distribute power equally; instead, as Tsebelis (2002) argues in his veto-player framework, they create asymmetric interdependencies where one actor can obstruct another's agenda without controlling outcomes directly.
This sourceDevelops a unified theory in which the capacity to change the status quo is set by the number, ideological distance, and internal cohesion of veto players; shows that nominally separate actors collapse into a single effective veto player when their preferences align — directly applicable to boards captured by the executives they nominally oversee.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The publisher's blurb shows veto players raise policy stability and block departure from the status quo, but not asymmetric interdependency or unequal power in checks and balances.
“He shows why an increase in the number of “veto players,” or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo.”
- Checks and balances do not distribute power equally; instead, as Tsebelis (2002) argues in his veto-player framework, they create asymmetric interdependencies where one actor can obstruct another's agenda without controlling outcomes directly.
- Separation of Powers
- However, board members are often selected by the CEO being overseen, creating circularity—a veto-player problem in the sense developed by Tsebelis (2002), where the effective number of independent veto players collapses if nominally separate actors share preferences induced by selection or patronage, leaving formal separation without restraining force.
This sourceDevelops a unified theory in which institutional capacity to change the status quo is determined by the number, ideological distance, and internal cohesion of veto players; shows that nominally separate actors collapse into a single effective veto player when selection or party discipline aligns their preferences—directly applicable to corporate boards captured by the executives they nominally oversee.
- However, board members are often selected by the CEO being overseen, creating circularity—a veto-player problem in the sense developed by Tsebelis (2002), where the effective number of independent veto players collapses if nominally separate actors share preferences induced by selection or patronage, leaving formal separation without restraining force.
Mechanisms¶
- Federated Governance Cadence
- Its failure mode is paralysis: give too many parties an effective veto and provide no decision rule, and the body becomes negotiation theater that never converges — the more actors whose assent is required, the harder any change becomes
This sourceDevelops the veto-player result that requiring assent from more actors increases policy stability and makes change harder.
- Its failure mode is paralysis: give too many parties an effective veto and provide no decision rule, and the body becomes negotiation theater that never converges — the more actors whose assent is required, the harder any change becomes
- Institutional Veto-Point Review
- Second it overlays the stakeholder power map: who occupies each veto point, how firm their control is (absolute veto, delay power, or mere influence), and where their interests sit relative to the change.
This sourceModels policy change through the actors whose agreement is required and the positions or preferences of those veto players.
- Second it overlays the stakeholder power map: who occupies each veto point, how firm their control is (absolute veto, delay power, or mere influence), and where their interests sit relative to the change.
- Veto-Point Review
- The concept of veto players is a well-developed one in political science and worth using precisely.
This sourceDevelops veto-player theory as a systematic comparative-politics framework for explaining how institutional actors constrain policy change.
- The concept of veto players is a well-developed one in political science and worth using precisely.
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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