Frankfurt cases¶

Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.

Version: v1 · 2026-09-28 · History
Domain-specific #: 9559
Domain group: Humanities
Origin domain: Philosophy
Subdomains: Free Will, Moral Responsibility → Philosophy

Core Idea¶

Frankfurt cases is treated here as the recurring social_sciences_humanities_arts identity summarized by this source-grounded definition: Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.

Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. If the connection between the agent's inclination and the agent's decision is deterministic, then proponents of the Frankfurt-style cases are charged with begging the question. A deterministic connection begs the question because proponents of Frankfurt-style cases are assuming the very thing that is being debated, that moral responsibility does not require alternate possibilities or the ability to do otherwise.

This is because they are operating from the get-go that moral responsibility requires free will. This is problematic for proponents of the Frankfurt-style cases because they are supposed to show a situation where an agent is morally responsible for the decision and yet is unable to truly do otherwise. This means that the agent's inclination is not necessarily indicative of what the agent's decision will be.

For Frankfurt cases, the abstraction is narrower than the article's general subject matter: a positive case must preserve Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. Retaining only the name, a familiar example, or a downstream effect is insufficient. The specialist roles and tests remain anchored in social_sciences_humanities_arts, which is why this identity is domain-specific rather than prime.

Structural Signature¶

Sig role-phrases:

Defining carrier — Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument.
Constitutive relation — Anyone with a theory concerning what "could have done otherwise" means may answer this question for [themselves] by describing whatever measures [they] would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones cannot do otherwise.
Operating condition — The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what [they have] done if [they] did it only because [they] could not have done otherwise".
Recognition evidence — One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma.
Admissible variation — This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane.
Characteristic consequence — This is because they are operating from the get-go that moral responsibility requires free will.
Failure boundary — Fischer has argued for this response by arguing that the Frankfurt-style case cannot stand alone, but must be taken in conjunction with other arguments.

What It Is Not¶

Not the whole field of social_sciences_humanities_arts. The node requires the specific identity stated by Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.
Not an over-broad reading. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.
Not an over-broad reading. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it.
Not an over-broad reading. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action, or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise.
Not automatically Compatibilism. Retrieval proximity does not establish equivalence; the two identities must be compared by carrier, operation, and failure boundary.

Scope of Application¶

Frankfurt cases applies literally inside social_sciences_humanities_arts wherever the source-defined carrier and relation can be established. Its documented habitats include:

Principle of alternate possibilities. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, often called the core argument for incompatibilism.
Principle of alternate possibilities. PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.
Principle of alternate possibilities. An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false.
Principle of alternate possibilities. Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.
Principle of alternate possibilities. Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, like A.
Principle of alternate possibilities. On a compatibilist analysis, an agent could have done otherwise just in case the counterfactual conditional 'if the agent had wanted to do otherwise, then they would have done otherwise' is true.

Outside social_sciences_humanities_arts, the name should be retained only when these same operational conditions survive; otherwise the comparison belongs to the broader parent Classification or should be marked as analogy.

Clarity¶

A clear use of Frankfurt cases names the carrier, the operative relation, and the conditions under which the source treats the identity as present. The minimal definition is Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. The strongest recognition evidence in the frozen account is: One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma. A report should distinguish that evidence from a proxy, consequence, or common implementation. It should also state the qualification According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. so that a reader can reproduce the classification rather than infer it from topical resemblance.

Manages Complexity¶

Frankfurt cases compresses multiple social_sciences_humanities_arts details into a stable diagnostic relation. The source shows both the central mechanism—anyone with a theory concerning what "could have done otherwise" means may answer this question for [themselves] by describing whatever measures [they] would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones cannot do otherwise.—and the practical consequence—this is because they are operating from the get-go that moral responsibility requires free will. This compression makes cases comparable while leaving parameters, conventions, exceptions, and evidential quality explicit. It is lossy by design: local history and implementation details may be omitted only when they do not alter the defining relation.

Abstract Reasoning¶

Type the carrier. Identify the social_sciences_humanities_arts entities to which the claim applies.
State the relation. Use the source-grounded identity: Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.
Check operation and conditions. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what [they have] done if [they] did it only because [they] could not have done otherwise".
Demand recognition evidence. One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma.
Test variation. Change an implementation or setting while preserving this objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane.
Run the collapse test. Remove the defining operation; if the label still seems equally apt, only a topic or correlate was retained.
Reduce cautiously. When the specialist conditions cannot be carried, route the residual comparison to Classification.

Knowledge Transfer¶

Within the home domain. Knowledge about Frankfurt cases transfers literally when a new case preserves the same carrier type, relation, and recognition test. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, often called the core argument for incompatibilism. PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.

Beyond the home domain. No canonical parent is asserted for Frankfurt cases. An outside case receives the specialist name only when the same typed roles and rejection conditions can be filled literally; otherwise the comparison remains an analogy pending later graph densification.

Examples¶

Canonical¶

On a compatibilist analysis, an agent could have done otherwise just in case the counterfactual conditional 'if the agent had wanted to do otherwise, then they would have done otherwise' is true. This case is canonical because it supplies a concrete carrier and lets the defining relation be checked rather than merely named.

Mapped back: carrier → the entities in the documented case; operation → Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise; recognition evidence → One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma

Applied / In Practice¶

In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. The applied case shows how the identity is used under a second setting or qualification while keeping the same operative relation.

Mapped back: changed setting → Frankfurt's objection; invariant → Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise; boundary → the case exits the class when according to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise

Structural Tensions¶

T1 — Stable identity versus admissible variation. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Which changes preserve the defining relation, and which replace it?

T2 — Recognition versus proxy. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Does the cited evidence establish the identity or only a correlated sign?

T3 — Definition versus implementation. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action, or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Is the observed implementation constitutive, optional, or merely common?

T4 — Scope versus overextension. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what [they have] done if [they] did it only because [they] could not have done otherwise". The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Can every claimed application fill the same typed roles without metaphor?

T5 — Transfer versus domain accent. Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Does the receiving case instantiate Frankfurt cases literally, co-instantiate Classification, or only resemble it?

T6 — Autonomy versus reduction. Anyone with a theory concerning what "could have done otherwise" means may answer this question for [themselves] by describing whatever measures [they] would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones cannot do otherwise. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: What does Frankfurt cases distinguish that the broader parent Classification leaves together?

Structural–Framed Character¶

Frankfurt cases is mixed or framed-leaning. Its structural side is the repeatable organization summarized by Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. Its framed side is the social_sciences_humanities_arts vocabulary that fixes the carrier, evidence, exceptions, and admissible transformations.

Evaluative weight: the identity can be stated descriptively even when applications carry practical stakes. Human-practice dependence: the source-grounded carrier determines whether the relation exists independently or is constituted by a practice. Institutional origin: disciplinary conventions stabilize the name and test. Vocabulary portability: The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what [they have] done if [they] did it only because [they] could not have done otherwise". Import versus recognition: literal transfer requires the same mechanism; shape alone is analogy.

Its portable skeleton is Classification. Its character: a recurring specialist identity whose thin organization can be abstracted, while its operational meaning remains domain-bound.

Structural Core vs. Domain Accent¶

What is skeletal. Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. The stable skeleton is the typed relation expressed in that definition and the entry's recognition and collapse tests. The source identifies these operative conditions: Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. Anyone with a theory concerning what "could have done otherwise" means may answer this question for [themselves] by describing whatever measures [they] would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones cannot do otherwise. It further constrains recognition and variation through: The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what [they have] done if [they] did it only because [they] could not have done otherwise". One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma.

What is domain-bound. social sciences humanities arts supplies the operative entities, technical vocabulary, warrants, and exceptions that make Frankfurt cases literal. Its documented scope includes the condition that The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, often called the core argument for incompatibilism. Another bounded application condition is that PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise. These are not decorative examples; they determine which carrier and evidence can fill the abstraction's roles.

Why no parent is asserted. Removing those specialist details does not currently yield one live catalog node that is a necessary genus for every instance. The entry is therefore approved as unparented rather than attached by topical resemblance. Its collapse evidence remains specific—This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane.—and future graph densification may discover a defensible relation only if it preserves that boundary.

This entry is a kind of Thought Experiment.

Approved unparented node. No current live node supplies a defensible necessary genus or structural prerequisite for Frankfurt cases. The reviewed identity is: Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. The accelerated suggestion was declined because topical or lexical similarity does not establish hierarchy; the node is admitted without a parent pending later graph densification.
Related reasoning operations. Evidence, representation, comparison, classification, transformation, or evaluation may participate in particular cases, but participation does not make any one of them a necessary parent of every instance.

Relationships to Other Abstractions¶

Current abstraction Frankfurt cases Domain-specific

Parents (1) — more general patterns this builds on

Frankfurt cases is a kind of Thought Experiment Prime

Frankfurt cases are thought-experiment counterexamples testing whether moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities.

Hierarchy paths (2) — routes to 2 parentless roots

Frankfurt cases → Thought Experiment → Counterfactual Reasoning

Show alternative path (1)

Neighborhood in Abstraction Space¶

Frankfurt cases sits in a sparse region of the domain-specific corpus (62^nd percentile for distinctiveness): few abstractions share its structure, so a faithful description tends to retrieve it precisely.

Family — Legal & Moral Philosophy Principles (16 abstractions)

Nearest neighbors

Computed from structural-signature embeddings · 2026-10-08

Not to Be Confused With¶

Classification. The parent omits the specialist differentia. Tell: Can the case establish Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise?
Compatibilism. The philosophical thesis that causal determinism can be true while agents can still possess free will or moral responsibility. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
Free will. The contested capacity for agents to choose or control actions in a way sufficient for genuine alternatives, authorship or moral responsibility. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
Counterfactuals. Alternate hypothetical scenarios. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
A measurement, proxy, or consequence. Those may provide evidence without being the identity. Tell: Would Frankfurt cases remain present if the detector or downstream effect changed?
A metaphorical analogue. A similar shape outside social_sciences_humanities_arts lacks the specialist mechanism. Tell: Do the native roles transfer literally, or only the parent Classification?

References¶

Frozen Wikipedia discovery revision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_cases (revision 1366037969).
Preserved source candidate: https://philpapers.org/rec/HUNMRA
Preserved source candidate: https://archive.org/details/philosophicaless00ayer
Preserved source candidate: https://archive.org/details/philosophicaless00ayer/page/271
Preserved source candidate: https://books.google.com/books?id=SUaEcWledHMC&pg=PA139
Preserved source candidate: http://web.nmsu.edu/~jvessel/Freedom%20and%20Necessity.pdf
Preserved source candidate: http://phidev.dss.ucdavis.edu/people/dcopp/david-copp-web-page/davids-pdfs/Copp1997DefendingPAPBlameworthinessandResponsibility.pdf
Preserved source candidate: https://philpapers.org/rec/FRAAPA-8
Preserved source candidate: https://books.google.com/books?id=SUaEcWledHMC&pg=PA194

The frozen Wikipedia revision is discovery provenance. The retained source set was reviewed for identity, formal or operational relation, and scope. The encyclopedia's structural synthesis is bounded to those claims; a thin authority surface is recorded as a nonblocking source-strengthening repair rather than concealed.