Philosophy¶
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278 domain-specific abstractions whose origin domain is Philosophy. They span 226 subdomains — sort by that column to group them, or click any subdomain to filter to it.
| Abstraction | Subdomain | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Absolute Metaphor | Blumenberg's term for a metaphor that cannot be fully replaced by literal conceptual terminology and instead provides an orienting image for questions that resist definitive conceptual resolution. | |
| Abstract and concrete | Distinguish philosophical entities by an explicitly chosen abstract-versus-concrete criterion while preserving paradigm cases, disputed cases, and the fact that no single criterion commands universal agreement. | |
| Abstract object theory | Abstract object theory (AOT) is a branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects. | |
| Academic Approach | An academic approach is a recognizable scholarly orientation that organizes which questions are salient, which concepts and assumptions frame them, which forms of evidence and method are acceptable, and how interpretations are evaluated within a research community. | |
| Accidental necessity | The disputed modal status according to which a contingent event, once past, is now unalterably or necessarily the case though it was not necessary before occurring. | |
| Akrasia | An agent intentionally acts against an available course they still judge better, all things considered. | |
| Amor fati | An affirmative practical attitude that loves one's fate by willing the whole of one's life—including suffering, loss, contingency, and recurrence—rather than merely enduring or resigning oneself to it. | |
| Ampliative | A medieval logical operation by which a common term's supposition is extended beyond presently existing things—especially under past- or future-tense verbs—to include things existing at the relevant other time. | |
| Animistic fallacy | The error of inferring that an observed order, event or outcome must have been intentionally caused merely because it occurred or appears organized. | |
| Appeal to Emotion | A persuasive move that asks an audience to let an elicited feeling bear on acceptance of a claim or choice. | |
| Appeal to the Stone | An informal fallacy that rejects a claim as absurd or false while supplying no reason that engages the claim. | |
| Appeal to Wealth | An informal fallacy that infers a person's insight, virtue, or argument's merit from financial status instead of relevant reasons. | |
| Argument from anecdote | Misuse of anecdotal evidence in the form of argument from anecdote is an informal fallacy and is sometimes referred to as the "person who" or anecdotal fallacy, with statements like "I know a person who..." or "I know of a case where...". | |
| Argument to moderation | A fallacy that treats a midpoint or compromise between opposed positions as correct merely because it lies between them, without independent support. | |
| Aristotle's theory of universals | A theory that universals exist immanently in individual substances rather than separately from them. | |
| Atheist's wager | A decision argument recommending moral conduct regardless of belief in God, because living well is preferable whether a benevolent deity exists or not. | |
| Atheistic Existentialism | An existentialist family of views in which no deity or transcendent order fixes human essence or purpose, so situated agents must form projects and assume responsibility without that guarantee. | |
| Aufheben | Hegel's dialectical sublation: a transition that simultaneously cancels a determination, preserves its content and raises it into a more encompassing form rather than merely destroying or retaining it. | |
| Baconian Method | Investigate a natural phenomenon through disciplined histories and tables of presence, absence, and degree, exclude incompatible candidate natures, form a provisional first interpretation, and test it against specially informative instances. | |
| Basic limiting principle | A usually tacit general assumption that bounds what an explanatory framework treats as possible or knowable. | |
| Beetle in a box | The beetle-in-a-box is a famous thought experiment that Wittgenstein introduces in the context of his investigation of pains. | |
| Begging the Question | Detect an argument whose premises presuppose the very conclusion they are offered to support — valid, even sound, yet dialectically empty — by testing whether the premises would survive an interlocutor who denies the conclusion. | |
| Betrayal | A social wrong in which a person or institution violates a relationship-defining entrusted expectation toward someone who relies on it, through harmful action or failure to provide expected protection or response. | |
| Buridan's ass | A choice paradox in which exactly tied alternatives and a no-tie-break rule lead to costly indecision. | |
| Cambridge change | A gain or loss of a predicate by an object that occurs solely because another object or relation changes, while the first object's relevant intrinsic constitution remains unchanged. | |
| Categorical proposition | A proposition asserting or denying that all or some members of a subject category belong to a predicate category. | |
| Causal adequacy principle | The Cartesian rule that a total efficient cause must possess at least as much metaphysical reality as its effect, formally in the same mode or eminently in a higher one. | |
| Causal closure | A metaphysical thesis that every physical event with a cause sufficient for its occurrence has a sufficient physical cause within the physical domain. | |
| Causal Theory of Reference | A semantic theory on which a name or natural-kind term refers through an appropriate historical-causal chain linking current use to an initial fixing or grounding in its referent, rather than through a uniquely identifying description held by each speaker. | |
| Causalism | The action-theory view that motivating reasons explain an intentional action by causally producing it. | |
| Classical Modal Logic | A propositional modal logic with necessity–possibility duality and replacement of provable equivalents, broader than the class of normal modal logics. | |
| Clifford's Principle | An ethics-of-belief norm holding that accepting or retaining a belief without sufficient evidence is morally wrong, together with a duty not to disregard relevant counterevidence. | |
| Clockwork Universe | A mechanistic world picture that likens the universe to a clock: an ordered machine whose components evolve under fixed laws from prior conditions, historically associated with early-modern mechanics, prediction, and often determinism. | |
| Competing goods | Competing goods are distinct valuable ends whose claims can conflict in a practical choice without one value necessarily reducing to, cancelling, or becoming commensurable with the other. | |
| Composition of causes | Composition of causes is Mill's principle that jointly acting causes normally retain efficacy and add their effects, with emergent interactions as an explicit boundary. | |
| Conatus | Spinoza's principle that each finite thing immanently strives to persevere in its being and enhance its power, within a broader early-modern history of conatus concepts. | |
| Conceptual necessity | Conceptual necessity is a property of the certainty with which a state of affairs, as presented by a certain description, occurs: it occurs by conceptual necessity if and only if it occurs just by virtue of the meaning of the description. | |
| Conjunction Introduction | The proof rule that combines derivations of A and B available in a common context into a derivation of their conjunction A ∧ B. | |
| Consequentialism | A family of normative ethical theories on which an act, rule, motive, institution, or other evaluand has its moral status solely in virtue of the value of the relevant consequences under a declared account of value, scope, information, and choice. | |
| Constructional System | A logical system in which every object or concept of a domain is constructed from a proper subset designated as its basis, exposing dependencies among the domain's conceptual elements. | |
| Constructive dilemma | A valid propositional inference from two conditionals and a disjunction of their antecedents to the disjunction of their consequents. | |
| Constructivist epistemology | Constructivist epistemology in philosophy of science holds that scientific knowledge and its models are actively constructed through conceptual, social, and investigative practices rather than passively copied from a theory-independent world. | |
| Continuous predicate | Continuous predicate is a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) to describe a special type of relational predicate that results as the limit of a recursive process of hypostatic abstraction. | |
| Declarative knowledge | Declarative knowledge, also known as theoretical knowledge, descriptive knowledge, propositional knowledge, and knowledge-that, is an awareness of facts that can be expressed using declarative sentences. | |
| Deductive-nomological model | The deductive-nomological model (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". | |
| Definiens | The word or group of words that is to be defined is called the definiendum, and the word, group of words, or action that defines it is called the definiens. | |
| Deflationary theory of truth | A family of theories holding that truth talk adds no substantial property beyond assertion, endorsement or semantic equivalence. | |
| Denotation | The entity, value, extension, truth condition, or semantic object that an expression is assigned under an interpretation, distinguished from associated connotations and many pragmatic effects. | |
| Denying the Antecedent | The invalid conditional inference that concludes not-Q from if-P-then-Q and not-P, treating a sufficient condition as necessary. | |
| Descriptive interpretation | A Carnapian interpretation of a formal system in which at least one primitive symbol denotes an empirical object or observable property. | |
| Destructive Dilemma | The valid propositional inference from P→Q, R→S, and ¬Q∨¬S to ¬P∨¬R, combining two modus-tollens branches under a disjunction. | |
| Deterritorialization | In Deleuze and Guattari's critical theory, the process by which relations, signs or practices are loosened from an established organizing context and made available for reconfiguration. | |
| Diagrammatic reasoning | Inference conducted through structured visual representations whose spatial relations carry semantic and inferential force. | |
| Dialectical monism | An ontological position that treats reality as one underlying whole whose unity necessarily appears through opposed, interdependent, and dynamically related poles rather than through featureless sameness. | |
| Dialectics | — | Contradictions drive change. |
| Direct reference theory | A semantic theory on which the contribution of a name or indexical to propositional content is its referent rather than a descriptive sense. | |
| Distinction without a Difference | An argumentative contrast offered as a reason for different treatment when it makes no difference under the criterion that governs the conclusion. | |
| Doxastic logic | A modal logic that formalizes what agents believe and how those beliefs interact with implication, introspection and consistency. | |
| Drowning child analogy | Singer raises a drowning child analogy in his essay: inaction is clearly immoral if a child is drowning in a shallow pond and someone can save them but chooses not to. | |
| Duck test | A colloquial abductive heuristic that identifies an unknown by the convergence of several familiar, repeatedly observed characteristics. | |
| Dutch Book Arguments | A finite fair-bet portfolio test that exposes incoherent event prices through a guaranteed loss in every admissible outcome. | |
| Dvaita Vedānta | Madhva's realist Vedānta system in which Vishnu alone is independent reality, souls and matter are eternally real but dependent, and five kinds of difference remain irreducible. | |
| Efficient cause | An efficient cause is the agent, interaction, or initiating source that brings a change or entity about within Aristotle's four-cause explanatory scheme. | |
| Egoism | A family of descriptive and normative views that gives the self, self-interest, or one's own will a central role in explaining or guiding action. | |
| Emergent materialism | A philosophy-of-mind position holding that mental properties depend entirely on material systems yet arise as novel, irreducible higher-level properties with autonomous explanatory laws. | |
| Energeia | Energeia is Aristotle's notion of actuality or being-at-work—the realized activity or fulfillment of a capacity—understood in contrast with potentiality. | |
| Epilogism | Epilogism (; lit. "appraisal" or "assessment") is a theory-free method of inference used in Ancient Greek philosophy and Ancient Greek medicine in order to arrive at insight without deductive reasoning or inference based on unobservables, relying solely on reflection of what is already both visible and evident. | |
| Epiphenomenalism | The philosophy-of-mind view that physical processes cause mental events while mental events exert no causal influence on physical events. | |
| Epistemic commitment | A defeasible responsibility to uphold a truth-apt proposition with reasons, accept its inferential consequences, and revise or withdraw it under appropriate counterevidence. | |
| Epistemic feedback | A feedback relation in which observing, measuring or reporting a phenomenon changes either the phenomenon observed or the subsequent observation method. | |
| Epistemic Innocence | A costly cognition can have context-dependent epistemic benefit when no less costly available alternative supplies that benefit. | |
| Ethics dumping | The export of research practices to lower-resource settings in order to evade or exploit weaker ethical protections. | |
| Evidential Decision Theory | A decision rule that prefers the act with highest outcome utility conditional on that act occurring, even when this diverges from causal-effect ranking. | |
| Exemplification | In the philosophy of language, exemplification is a mode of symbolization characterized by the relation between a sample and what it refers to. | |
| Extensionality | The principle that objects of a given kind are equal when they have the same externally observable members, values or behavior, as formalized for sets, functions and relations. | |
| Fallacy of accent | The fallacy of accent (also known as accentus, from its Latin denomination, and misleading accent ) is a verbal fallacy that reasons from two different vocal readings of the same written words. | |
| Fallacy of Four Terms | A purported categorical syllogism in which two premises contain four effective terms rather than one shared middle term and two extremes, so the conclusion's extremes are not inferentially linked. | |
| Fallacy of the Single Cause | A causal-reasoning error that treats one contributing factor as the sole sufficient explanation of an outcome when the evidence supports multiple interacting, jointly sufficient, enabling, or alternative causes. | |
| False attribution | An argumentative fallacy in which a claim is supported by assigning it to an irrelevant, unqualified, unidentified, biased, distorted, or fabricated source, thereby substituting borrowed authority for evidence; distinct from accidental misattribution unless the attribution functions persuasively. | |
| Fatalism | A family of views holding that at least some future outcomes are inevitable or outside effective human control, sometimes joined to resignation on the ground that resistance cannot alter what is destined. | |
| Faulty generalization | An informal fallacy that infers a broad population claim from evidence too small, biased or unrepresentative to warrant that scope. | |
| Fitch's paradox of knowability | Fitch's paradox of knowability is a puzzle of epistemic logic. | |
| Form of the Good | In Plato’s philosophy, the supreme Form that makes intelligible things knowable and gives truth, order, and value to the other Forms, analogized in the Republic to the sun’s enabling of sight and life. | |
| Formal ethics | Represent consistency constraints on moral judgments in a modal–deontic logical system while leaving substantive moral content underdetermined. | |
| Formation rule | A syntactic rule that recursively determines which symbol strings or expressions are well formed in a formal language, independently of their meaning or truth. | |
| Four Causes | Explain an Aristotelian thing or change through four complementary aitiai: what it is made from, the form by which it is what it is, the source of change, and that for the sake of which it occurs. | |
| Four-Valued Logic | A finite-valued logical system whose semantics distinguishes exactly four values, with the meaning and connective tables fixed by a declared logic rather than by cardinality alone. | |
| Frankfurt cases | Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. | |
| Free variables and bound variables | The distinction between variable occurrences whose values are supplied by an external assignment and occurrences captured by a quantifier, lambda or other binder within an expression. | |
| Frege's Puzzles | The paired semantic challenge that co-referring expressions can differ in cognitive value and can fail to substitute truth-preservingly inside propositional-attitude reports. | |
| Frege–Church ontology | A semantic ontology distinguishing objects or denotations, names or expressions, and concepts or senses to preserve intensional differences under reference-preserving substitution. | |
| Frequentist Probability | Interpret an event's probability through its stable long-run relative frequency in a specified repeatable reference sequence. | |
| Game | A bounded activity in which participants act under constitutive rules within an artificial challenge or play structure that gives states, actions, and outcomes game-internal significance. | |
| Gamer's Dilemma | A virtual-ethics consistency problem asking what principle justifies divergent judgments about simulated acts when neither directly harms a real depicted victim. | |
| Gavagai | Quine's radical-translation thought experiment showing that behavioral evidence can underdetermine whether an unfamiliar utterance refers to rabbits, stages, parts, or another proxy ontology. | |
| Gaze | Positioned looking or being seen that shapes how a person is interpreted or made socially visible. | |
| Genetic reductionism | The view that genes alone or primarily suffice to explain complex traits, behavior or social outcomes. | |
| Golden Rule | An interpersonal moral heuristic asks agents to guide their treatment of others by how they would wish or accept corresponding treatment themselves. | |
| Grounding (metaphysics) | A non-causal metaphysical dependence relation in which one fact or entity obtains in virtue of more fundamental grounds. | |
| Hand-waving | A pejorative description of argument that substitutes vague plausibility, rhetoric or omitted steps for the evidence or derivation required to support a conclusion. | |
| Hanlon's razor | A rule of thumb advising that harmful or frustrating behavior should not be attributed to malice when error, incompetence, ignorance, or another less intentional cause adequately explains it. | |
| Hasty generalization | Hasty generalization is the fallacy of examining just one or very few examples or studying a single case and generalizing that to be representative of the whole class of objects or phenomena. | |
| Hempel's dilemma | Hempel's dilemma is a question first asked (at least on record) by the philosopher Carl Hempel in 1969. | |
| Hempel's Paradox | Expose that treating confirmation as yes/no forces the absurd conclusion that a white shoe confirms 'all ravens are black' via the contrapositive — dissolved by grading confirmation, so a non-black non-raven confirms only by a vanishing likelihood ratio. | |
| Heterophenomenology | Treat a person's reports of conscious experience as sincere evidence about how things seem while constructing a revisable third-person account that neither grants those reports incorrigible authority nor dismisses their intentional content. | |
| Heterotopia (space) | A real 'other space' in Foucault's spatial analysis whose organization juxtaposes, mirrors, contests, or compensates for surrounding social spaces, often through distinctive access and time relations. | |
| Hitchens's Razor | A burden-of-support rule allowing an assertion offered without evidence to be withheld or dismissed without a contrary evidential case, while not thereby proving it false. | |
| Homeostatic property cluster theory | A theory of natural kinds in which overlapping property clusters are sustained by causal mechanisms without every member sharing one defining essence. | |
| Homestead Principle | A normative rule of original acquisition under which a previously unowned or commonly available resource may become a claimant's property through a qualifying act such as first occupancy, productive use, or labor, subject to the theory's publicity, boundary, and proviso conditions. | |
| Hume's Fork | Hume's division between necessary relations of ideas known through thought and contingent matters of fact warranted through experience. | |
| Hypocrisy | The solicitation of moral, social, or institutional standing through a professed norm or identity that conflicts with concealed commitments, conduct, motives, or self-exemptions. | |
| I'm Entitled to My Opinion | Using one's right to hold a view as a substitute for reasons that the view is true or justified. | |
| Identity theory of mind | Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory, and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. | |
| Immanent critique | A critical method that evaluates a social form by exposing contradictions between its own professed norms and its realized institutions or practices. | |
| Immaterial Spatial Entity | A spatial particular — a hole, room, or border — that has a location, shape, and history yet is constituted of no matter, individuated instead by its relation to material bearers, and admitted (or not) as a first-class entity by whether eliminating it into bearer-talk loses a fact. | |
| Imperfect induction | The imperfect induction is the process of inferring from a sample of a group to what is characteristic of the whole group. | |
| Impossible World | A world-like semantic point that violates stated possibility constraints, used to interpret contradictions, non-normal logics, or counterpossibles. | |
| Incorrigibility | A proposition or belief status such that the subject cannot be mistaken about it or cannot revise it through correction. | |
| Intergenerational equity | A justice principle requiring benefits, burdens, opportunities and inherited resources to be assessed fairly across present and future generations. | |
| Interpellation (philosophy) | Interpellation is a concept introduced to Marxist theory by Louis Althusser as the mechanism through which pre-existing social structures "constitute" (or construct) individual human organisms as subjects (with consciousness and agency). | |
| Interpretation (logic) | An assignment of denotations to the nonlogical symbols of a formal language over a domain, determining the truth or satisfaction of its formulas. | |
| Introspection | Introspection is the examination of one's own conscious thoughts and feelings. | |
| Is-Ought Problem | Hume's principle that no purely descriptive premises can by themselves deductively entail a normative conclusion — so any move from 'is' to 'ought' requires an explicit, defensible bridging value premise, and its absence marks a category error. | |
| Jus Post Bellum | Jus post bellum ( ; Latin for "justice after war") is a concept that deals with the morality of the termination phase of war, including the responsibility to rebuild. | |
| Kant's Antinomies | Kant's four paired cosmological arguments in which reason appears to prove opposed claims about the world as a whole. | |
| Kathekon | A Stoic appropriate action justified by an agent's nature and circumstances without requiring perfected virtue. | |
| Kavka's toxin puzzle | Kavka's toxin puzzle is a thought experiment about the possibility of forming an intention to perform an act which, following from reason, is an action one would not actually perform. | |
| Khudi | Muhammad Iqbal's doctrine of the self as a real, developing center of agency strengthened through disciplined self-affirmation, relation to God and community, and responsible action rather than self-annihilation. | |
| KK thesis | The KK thesis or KK principle (also known as epistemic transparency or positive introspection) is a principle of epistemic logic which states that "If you know that P is the case then you know that you know that P is the case." This means that one cannot know that P is, if one does not know whether one's knowledge of P is correct. | |
| Knowledge by presence | Knowledge by presence in Islamic philosophy is immediate non-representational awareness in which the known reality is present to the knower rather than apprehended through a separate acquired concept or mental form. | |
| Language of thought hypothesis | The hypothesis that cognition operates over an internal language-like system of compositional mental representations with combinatorial syntax and semantics. | |
| Lesser of two evils principle | The lesser of two evils principle, also referred to as the lesser evil principle and lesser-evilism, is the ethical principle that, when faced with selecting from two immoral options, the less immoral one should be chosen. | |
| Lewis's Triviality Result | An impossibility argument showing that a fixed conditional proposition cannot generally have probability equal to conditional probability throughout a nontrivial class closed under relevant conditioning. | |
| Liar Paradox | A truth-status contradiction arising when a sentence directly or indirectly says of itself that it is false or not true under sufficiently strong truth principles. | |
| Line of Flight | A deterritorializing trajectory within an assemblage that enables escape, new connection, and transformation while remaining vulnerable to capture. | |
| Locke's place-time-kind principle | Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. | |
| Logical connective | A formal operator that forms a compound formula from one or more formulas and whose semantics determines the compound's truth or satisfaction from its arguments. | |
| Logical Consequence | A logic-relative relation licensing a formula as following from premises under a specified semantic or derivational criterion. | |
| Logical cube | A three-dimensional opposition diagram that organizes eight categorical propositions and displays their contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety and subalternation relations. | |
| Logical form | A precise formal-semantic representation of a statement or argument that exposes the structure relevant to validity and interpretation. | |
| Logical graph | Peirce's existential-graph notation and calculus, in which logical assertions are arranged spatially on a sheet using juxtaposition, enclosure by cuts, identity lines, and transformation rules rather than only linear formulas. | |
| Logical possibility | The status of a proposition that is satisfiable or at least not refutable under the axioms, inference rules, semantics, and consistency policy of a specified logical system. | |
| Lottery paradox | The inconsistency between accepting each highly probable claim that an individual lottery ticket will lose and accepting the certain claim that some ticket will win. | |
| Mandeville's paradox | Mandeville's paradox is named after Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), who posits that actions which may be qualified as vicious with regard to individuals have benefits for society as a whole. | |
| Material Inference | An inference licensed by the nonlogical conceptual content of its premises and conclusion rather than by logical form alone. | |
| Meaning Postulate | An object-language semantic axiom that restricts interpretations of lexical predicates, so a stipulated word relation supports analytic inferences beyond logical form alone. | |
| Meno's Paradox | Meno (; , Ménōn) is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 385 BC, but set at an earlier date around 402 BC. | |
| Mereology | The formal study of part–whole relations and the structures generated by parthood. | |
| Mereotopology | A formal theory combining part–whole relations with topological notions such as connection, contact, interior and boundary, often using regions rather than points as primitives. | |
| Metalanguage | A language used to name, quote, define or make claims about expressions and structures of another object language. | |
| Mill's Methods | Five comparative methods for inductively identifying possible causal conditions through agreement, difference, combined comparison, residues, and concomitant variation. | |
| Modal Status | A modal status is the classification of a proposition, state of affairs, event, or world as actual, possible, necessary, contingent, or impossible relative to specified accessibility, logical, metaphysical, temporal, epistemic, or normative semantics. | |
| Modus ponens | The valid inference rule that from a conditional P → Q and its antecedent P derives the consequent Q, with validity determined by the conditional's formal system and not by the empirical truth, relevance, or persuasiveness of the premises. | |
| Monotonicity of entailment | A logical property whereby every conclusion entailed by a premise set remains entailed after any additional premises are added. | |
| Moore's paradox | The peculiar absurdity of sincerely asserting ‘p, but I do not believe p’ or ‘p, but I believe not-p’ in the first person and present tense, even though either conjunction can be true and is not logically contradictory. | |
| Moral authority | Legitimacy to influence judgment or conduct grounded in perceived ethical principle and integrity rather than formal coercive office. | |
| Moral intellectualism | Moral intellectualism makes knowledge or rational understanding of the good constitutive of virtue and, in strong versions, sufficient for right action. | |
| Moral particularism | Hold that sound moral judgment does not depend on applying a sufficient stock of invariant moral principles because a consideration's relevance or polarity can change with the other features of the particular case. | |
| Moral perception | The discernment of morally salient features in a particular situation that structures what an agent notices before or within explicit moral deliberation. | |
| Moral responsibility | The status of being appropriately answerable to praise, blame, reward, or punishment for action or omission. | |
| Multiple occupancy view | The multiple occupancy view explains symmetrical fission by positing numerically distinct continuants that coincide before the split and follow different later branches. | |
| N-universes | A family of deliberately simplified philosophical world-models that varies a small set of entities and criteria to isolate the structure of paradoxes and thought experiments. | |
| Natural rights and legal rights | Natural rights are claimed to hold independently of particular institutions, whereas legal rights are created, recognized, and alterable within a specific legal system. | |
| Naturalization of intentionality | According to Franz Brentano, intentionality refers to the "aboutness of mental states that cannot be a physical relation between a mental state and what it is about (its object) because in a physical relation each of the relata must exist whereas the objects of mental states might not.". | |
| Naïve Realism (Philosophy of Perception) | The view that genuine perception constitutively relates a subject to ordinary mind-independent objects. | |
| Neutral monism | Hold that ultimate reality has one fundamental kind whose intrinsic nature is neither mental nor physical, while mental and physical phenomena are derivative organizations or aspects of that neutral basis. | |
| Newton's Flaming Laser Sword | A philosophical razor that withholds serious dispute from propositions unless precise reasoning connects them to observable consequences capable of settling the dispute. | |
| Nominalism | In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. | |
| Non-normal modal logic | A non-normal modal logic is a variant of modal logic that deviates from the basic principles of normal modal logics. | |
| Nonmaleficence | The ethical duty to avoid preventable, unnecessary, or disproportionate harm while evaluating intervention, restraint, alternatives, safeguards, and uncertainty. | |
| Nonsense | Nonsense is communication or symbol production that fails to yield a coherent interpretation under the relevant linguistic, logical, or representational rules, whether unintentionally or as a deliberate literary construction. | |
| Norm (philosophy) | A prescriptive standard, rule or reason that guides or evaluates action through what ought, may or must be done rather than merely describing what is the case. | |
| Normal modal logic | A normal modal logic contains all propositional tautologies and the distribution axiom K, and is closed under uniform substitution, modus ponens, and necessitation. | |
| Noumenon | In Kantian philosophy, an object considered independently of the conditions of sensible intuition, functioning as a limiting contrast to phenomena rather than an object of empirical knowledge. | |
| Obligationes | A medieval rule-governed disputation in which a respondent temporarily accepts a positum and must grant, deny, doubt, or distinguish successive propositions consistently while an opponent probes for contradiction. | |
| Ontological Paradox | Assess a self-causing closed causal loop — an object or piece of information that exists with no origin traceable outside the loop — by testing whether it is self-consistent (coherent, unlike the grandfather paradox) yet still lacking a traceable origin. | |
| Overwhelming Exception | An informal fallacy in which material exceptions shrink a broad-sounding claim so far that its surviving scope no longer supports the advertised conclusion. | |
| Paraconsistent logic | A logic whose consequence relation does not validate explosion, allowing some contradictions without every proposition becoming derivable. | |
| Paradigm-Case Argument | Answer a sweeping skeptical denial by identifying an actual central case through which the disputed expression is ordinarily taught or applied, while keeping the argument’s semantic premises distinct from stronger metaphysical claims. | |
| Paradox of analysis | — | The puzzle that a correct conceptual analysis appears uninformative if analysandum and analysans mean the same thing, yet incorrect if they do not. |
| Paradoxes of material implication | Classically valid consequences of the truth-functional conditional that conflict with ordinary expectations about relevance, causation or inferential connection in natural-language if–then statements. | |
| Pascal's Mugging | In philosophy, Pascal's mugging is a thought experiment demonstrating a problem in expected utility maximization. | |
| Pascal's wager | A prudential argument that, under a stylized decision matrix, finite worldly costs of cultivating belief are outweighed by the possibility of infinite salvation if God exists, offered as a reason to wager and practice rather than as evidential proof of God's existence. | |
| Paternalism | Paternalism is action that limits a person's or group's liberty or autonomy against their will and is intended to promote their own good. | |
| Performative Contradiction | Expose a conflict between what an utterance asserts and a condition its very performance pragmatically presupposes. | |
| Phenomenal concept strategy | A physicalist response to consciousness arguments that locates the apparent explanatory gap in special concepts used to think about experience rather than in an ontological gap. | |
| Phenomenal conservatism | The epistemic principle that if it seems to a subject that p, that seeming supplies prima facie justification for believing p unless defeated by contrary evidence or reliability concerns. | |
| Phonocentrism | The doctrine or bias that treats speech and sound as more immediate, fundamental or authoritative than writing or signed language. | |
| Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality | Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality treats Quality as fundamental to reality and distinguishes dynamic Quality from patterned static levels rather than beginning with a subject–object division. | |
| Plato's Beard | Quine's name for the riddle that meaningful denial of an entity seems to require that entity to exist in some sense, entangling language about nonbeing with ontological commitment. | |
| Poiesis | Poiesis is the process by which something not previously existing is brought into being, including self-producing forms such as autopoiesis. | |
| Political freedom | Political freedom, also called political autonomy or political agency, is a central concept in history and political thought and one of the most important features of democratic societies. | |
| Popperian Growth of Knowledge | A critical-rationalist model in which inquiry advances from problems through bold conjectures, attempted error elimination, and successor problems rather than through inductive accumulation or final verification. | |
| Postpositivism | Postpositivism or postempiricism is a metatheoretical stance that critiques and amends positivism and has impacted theories and practices across philosophy, social sciences, and various models of scientific inquiry. | |
| Power-knowledge | Foucault’s concept that regimes of knowledge and relations of power mutually produce and sustain one another. | |
| Principle of Charity | Constrain interpretation toward readings that make a speaker broadly coherent, rational, and substantially right, while preserving evidence and genuine disagreement. | |
| Principle of double effect | An ethical doctrine distinguishing an intended good effect from a foreseen but unintended harmful side effect under conditions of act permissibility, proportionality, and noninstrumentality. | |
| Principle of Explosion | A logic-relative consequence rule under which a proposition and its negation together entail any formula whatsoever. | |
| Principle of sufficient reason | The philosophical principle that every contingent fact has a sufficient reason why it obtains rather than not. | |
| Private language argument | Wittgenstein’s argument that a language whose signs refer only to one person’s intrinsically private sensations cannot sustain the public standards required for meaningful rule-following. | |
| Probabilistic causation | A family of causal theories in which a cause changes, typically raises, the probability of its effect under an appropriate comparison and background context. | |
| Process Philosophy | A family of metaphysical programs that treats becoming, occurrence, activity, and dynamically organized relations as primary, reconstructing enduring things as stabilized patterns of process. | |
| Professional ethics | A profession-specific system of duties, standards, virtues, conflicts controls, and accountability governing how specialized authority is exercised toward clients, colleagues, institutions, and the public. | |
| Prohairesis | The deliberative moral choice or faculty of assent that ancient Greek ethics, especially Epictetus's Stoicism, treats as properly one's own and central to agency and character. | |
| Proof by example | The invalid inference that a universal claim has been proved merely by exhibiting one or several favorable instances. | |
| Proof-theoretic semantics | An approach to meaning in which the inferential rules governing an expression, especially introduction and elimination rules, constitute or determine its semantic content. | |
| Proposition | An abstract content expressed by a declarative utterance, capable of being believed, denied or evaluated as true or false independently of the particular sentence expressing it. | |
| Propositional attitude | A belief-like, desire-like, or intention-like mental stance that an agent bears toward propositionally structured content. | |
| Psychological determinism | The view that psychological states and actions are fully determined by antecedent motives, reasons, character or other conditions outside an agent’s ultimate control. | |
| Psychophysical parallelism | A philosophy-of-mind position holding that mental and bodily event streams correspond systematically without directly causing one another. | |
| Public Reason | Public reason is a family of political-justification ideals asking whether coercive power can be justified to free and equal citizens amid reasonable pluralism. | |
| Quality inherence | Refuse to let a property exist on its own — bind every attribute to a bearer, a context, and the inherence relation that ties them, so a value with no namable owner is a category error, not a discovery. | |
| Quantifier Shift | An invalid inference from a possibly different witness for each case to one fixed witness for every case, without a premise licensing the stronger quantifier scope. | |
| Quantifier variance | The term quantifier variance refers to claims that there is no uniquely best ontological language with which to describe the world. | |
| Quidditism | In metaphysics, quidditism is the perspective implied by the belief that nomological roles do not supervene on causal properties. | |
| Radical constructivism | An epistemology treating knowledge as viable organization of experience rather than verifiable correspondence with a mind-independent world. | |
| Radical probabilism | An epistemological view that rational belief is graded throughout and can be revised without treating incoming evidence as a proposition learned with certainty. | |
| Radical unintelligibility | Radical Unintelligibility, a term coined by Bernard Lonergan, is the philosophical idea that we can act against our better judgment. | |
| Ranking Theory | Represent plain belief and its revision through ordinal degrees of disbelief assigned to possible worlds. | |
| Rationalism | An epistemological position giving reason, intellectual intuition or deduction priority as a source or test of at least some substantive knowledge independently of sensory experience. | |
| Received view of theories | The received view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions which are considered to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. | |
| Regular modal logic | A classical modal logic closed under a rule lifting conjunction-preserving implication through necessity and containing the duality of necessity and possibility. | |
| Relational space | A metaphysical view that spatial facts consist in relations among material objects or events rather than occupancy of an independently existing spatial container. | |
| Relevance logic | A family of nonclassical logics requiring a substantive connection between the antecedent and consequent of a valid implication. | |
| Religious alienation | A philosophical and social-theoretical account in which religious representations estrange human capacities, products or self-understanding from the people who generate them. | |
| Representationalism (Indirect Realism) | In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct (or naïve) realism, as opposed to indirect (or representational) realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences. | |
| Research Program | A sustained, socially organized line of inquiry that coordinates a community, a relatively stable problem framework or core commitments, and a revisable sequence of theories, methods, or projects over time. | |
| Rhizome (philosophy) | Model an assemblage as a heterogeneous, multiple-entry, non-arborescent field of connections whose paths can break, reconnect, and be mapped without deriving every element from one root or hierarchy. | |
| Rotation method | Kierkegaard's aesthetic strategy for resisting boredom by varying how limited circumstances are perceived and used rather than endlessly changing circumstances. | |
| Rule of replacement | Rewrite a designated subformula with a logically equivalent expression inside a larger propositional formula while preserving the whole formula's truth conditions. | |
| Russell's Teapot | Russell's teapot is an analogy, formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), to illustrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies upon a person making empirically unfalsifiable claims, as opposed to shifting the burden of disproof to others. | |
| Schema (Kant) | A time-structured rule by which Kant’s imagination mediates between a pure category and sensible appearances. | |
| Scientific consensus | Scientific consensus is the collective judgment, position, and opinion of the vast majority of active, qualified experts on a conclusion in a specific scientific discipline. | |
| Scientific Diagram | A scientific diagram is a convention-governed visual representation that maps observations, model variables, or derived quantities into spatial coordinates, symbols, curves, regions, or relations so that scientific structure can be compared, calculated, diagnosed, or inferred. | |
| Scientific Hypothesis | A sufficiently specific explanatory, relational, or predictive claim proposed for observation-linked evaluation, with identifiable consequences and evidence-sensitive conditions for support, revision, or rejection. | |
| Scientific pluralism | Scientific pluralism is a position within the philosophy of science that rejects various proposed unities of scientific method and subject matter. | |
| Self-sampling assumption | The self-indication assumption (SIA) is a philosophical principle defined in Anthropic Bias. | |
| Semantic Externalism | A speaker's linguistic reference, and on some accounts content, is partly fixed by the physical or social environment rather than internal state alone. | |
| Semantic holism | The view that the meaning of a linguistic expression depends on its relations to a substantially larger language or belief system. | |
| Semantic theory of truth | A formal account defining truth for an object language in a suitably stronger metalanguage through recursive satisfaction and T-schema instances. | |
| Sense and Reference | Frege’s semantic distinction between an expression’s objective mode of presentation and the object or truth-value it designates. | |
| Ship of Theseus | Expose that 'is it still the same thing?' has no brute answer once total component replacement pulls substrate-continuity apart from pattern-continuity — the verdict is relative to which identity criterion you have decided counts. | |
| Simulation Hypothesis | The simulation hypothesis proposes that what one experiences as the real world is actually a simulated reality, such as a computer simulation in which humans are constructs. | |
| Speciesism | Differential moral consideration or treatment based on species membership, often criticized as an unjustified bias favoring human interests over comparable interests of other animals. | |
| Spider Diagram | A diagrammatic logic extending Euler regions with spiders, shading, and compound Boolean structure to assert cardinality and set-membership constraints under formal semantics. | |
| Square of opposition | In term logic (a branch of philosophical logic), the square of opposition is a diagram representing the relations between the four basic categorical propositions. | |
| Strong emergence | Usage of the notion "emergence" is often subdivided into two perspectives: "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". | |
| Subalternation | In the traditional square of opposition, the immediate inference from a universal categorical proposition to its corresponding particular proposition, and contrapositively from the particular's falsity to the universal's falsity. | |
| Subverted Support | An explanatory fallacy in which reasons are offered for an alleged event, condition, or phenomenon before establishing that the explanandum actually occurred or exists. | |
| Sunrise problem | The problem of assigning predictive probability to the next recurrence of a repeatedly observed event, exposing how induction depends on prior assumptions. | |
| Suppressed Correlative | A fallacy in which one member of an intended contrast is redefined so broadly that it absorbs the other, making the distinction vacuous and eliminating the alternative by stipulation. | |
| Supreme Emergency | In just-war theory, a supreme emergency is an imminent and catastrophic threat to a political community claimed to justify or excuse action otherwise prohibited by jus in bello. | |
| Svasaṃvedana | In Buddhist philosophy, svasaṃvedana (also svasaṃvitti) is a term which refers to the reflexive nature of consciousness, or the awareness of being aware. | |
| Symbol (formal) | An abstract atomic item in a formal language whose concrete inscriptions or encodings are token instances rather than the symbol itself. | |
| T-schema | The disquotational schema stating that the named sentence S is true if and only if S. | |
| Temporality | In philosophy, temporality refers to the idea of a linear progression of past, present, and future. | |
| The Saying and the Said | A Levinasian distinction between language as pre-propositional ethical exposure to another and language as the necessary thematic content that identifies, communicates, and can also totalize. | |
| Theological noncognitivism | Theological noncognitivism is the non-theist position that religious language, particularly theological terminology such as 'God', is not intelligible or meaningful, and thus sentences like 'God exists' are cognitively meaningless. | |
| Theological Veto | A philosophy-of-religion diagnosis in which claimed revelation or divine sovereignty is used to deny independent human reason standing to examine, revise, or reject theological claims. | |
| Thick concept | Combine substantial descriptive content with an evaluative valence in one concept, so competent application both characterizes a case and ordinarily commends or condemns it. | |
| Trademark argument | The trademark argument is an a priori argument for the existence of God developed by the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes. | |
| Transactionalism | A pragmatist philosophical approach that treats persons, environments and meanings as mutually constituted within ongoing transactions rather than as independent entities that later interact. | |
| Transcendental idealism | Kant’s doctrine that objects of experience appear under a priori forms and categories supplied by cognition, while things in themselves are not thereby known. | |
| Trivial Objections | The fallacy of treating minor objections as sufficient to defeat a larger claim they leave substantially untouched. | |
| Trivialism | The logical or metaphysical thesis that every proposition is true, including each contradiction and its negation. | |
| Truthmaker theory | Truthmaker theory is "the branch of metaphysics that explores the relationships between what is true and what exists". | |
| Two wrongs don't make a right | The maxim 'two wrongs do not make a right' denies that another party's prior wrongdoing supplies sufficient moral justification for a retaliatory or otherwise wrongful act. | |
| Ubuntu philosophy | A family of Bantu-African moral and social philosophies that understand personhood, responsibility, and flourishing as constituted through reciprocal relationships with other people and the surrounding world. | |
| Ugly duckling theorem | A formal result showing that, when every logically definable predicate is weighted equally, any two distinct objects share the same number of properties, so similarity requires inductive bias. | |
| Unity of the Proposition | The problem of explaining what makes representational constituents compose one truth-evaluable proposition rather than a mere list or aggregate. | |
| Universal pragmatics | Habermas's reconstruction of the general validity claims and communicative competencies presupposed when speakers seek mutual understanding through language. | |
| Unmoved mover | The unmoved mover (), or prime mover (), is a concept advanced by Aristotle as a primary cause, or first uncaused cause, or "mover" of all the motion in the universe. | |
| Value (ethics) | Mark an object, state, trait, relation, or activity as good, bad, worthy, choice-giving, or reason-providing under an ethical evaluative standard, while distinguishing bearers, grounds, and intrinsic from instrumental status. | |
| Violinist Thought Experiment | Granting for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, Thomson uses thought experiments to argue that the right to life does not include, entail, or imply the right to use someone else's body to survive and that induced abortion is therefore morally permissible. | |
| Virtue aesthetics | Virtue aesthetics is treating aesthetics similarly to the frameworks of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. | |
| Vitalism | Vitalism is an idea that living organisms are differentiated from the non-living by the presence of forces, properties or powers including those which may not be physical or chemical. | |
| Worldview | An encompassing orientation through which a person or community interprets reality, including assumptions about what exists, how knowledge works, what matters and how life should be conducted. | |
| Wu wei | A Chinese philosophical ideal of unforced, noncoercive action that accords with the spontaneous course of a situation. |