Locke's place-time-kind principle¶

Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once.

Version: v1 · 2026-09-28 · History
Domain-specific #: 10468
Domain group: Humanities
Origin domain: Philosophy
Subdomains: Metaphysics, Personal Identity → Philosophy

Core Idea¶

Locke's place-time-kind principle is treated here as the recurring social_sciences_humanities_arts identity summarized by this source-grounded definition: Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once.

Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. In contemporary discussions of Locke, the principle is often used to summarize and interpret the opening of his chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). In Locke's own presentation, the principle functions as part of his account of identity and individuation: when we ask whether something is "the same," we refer it to a determinate time and place of existence, where it excludes other things of the same kind.

Locke also ties this thought to the idea of solidity (impenetrability), defining solidity as a body's resistance to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses. There are some counterexamples to Locke's thesis in the philosophical literature. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.

For Locke's place-time-kind principle, the abstraction is narrower than the article's general subject matter: a positive case must preserve Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. Retaining only the name, a familiar example, or a downstream effect is insufficient. The specialist roles and tests remain anchored in social_sciences_humanities_arts, which is why this identity is domain-specific rather than prime.

Structural Signature¶

Sig role-phrases:

Defining carrier — If Thin persists through the interweaving process, and if Thick is a genuine object of that same kind, then (Spolaore argues) the result is a pair of distinct same-kind entities that wholly coincide.
Constitutive relation — He defines solidity by appeal to resistance: a body resists "the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.".
Operating condition — When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.
Recognition evidence — When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other.
Admissible variation — That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse.
Characteristic consequence — That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.
Failure boundary — Locke then gives a concrete illustration using bodies: if two bodies could be in the same place at the same time, the "two parcels of matter" would have to be one and the same, undermining the distinction between "one" and "more.".

What It Is Not¶

Not the whole field of social_sciences_humanities_arts. The node requires the specific identity stated by Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once.
Not an over-broad reading. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse.
Not an over-broad reading. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.
Not an over-broad reading. Commentators commonly read this account of solidity as grounding Locke's treatment of bodies as occupying space in a way that excludes other bodies from the same place, distinguishing bodies from empty space (the void).
Not automatically Law of Identity. Retrieval proximity does not establish equivalence; the two identities must be compared by carrier, operation, and failure boundary.

Scope of Application¶

Locke's place-time-kind principle applies literally inside social_sciences_humanities_arts wherever the source-defined carrier and relation can be established. Its documented habitats include:

Role in Locke's philosophyFormulation. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.
Interpretations. Gideon Yaffe connects the principle to Locke's account of existence over time and to Locke's treatment of "place" as relative to our purposes and to the kind under which we are classifying an entity.
Counterexamples. Spolaore calls these counterexamples "conditional" because, on his presentation, they follow from commitments that many opponents of the stronger anti-coincidence principle already accept; rejecting them would require either denying the persistence claims used in familiar coincidence arguments, or sharply restricting which kinds count as "substantial" in a way that threatens the thesis's broader metaphysical interest.
Documented setting. In contemporary discussions of Locke, the principle is often used to summarize and interpret the opening of his chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).
Documented setting. In Locke's own presentation, the principle functions as part of his account of identity and individuation: when we ask whether something is "the same," we refer it to a determinate time and place of existence, where it excludes other things of the same kind.
Role in Locke's philosophyFormulation. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other.

Outside social_sciences_humanities_arts, the name should be retained only when these same operational conditions survive; otherwise the comparison belongs to the broader parent Pattern or should be marked as analogy.

Clarity¶

A clear use of Locke's place-time-kind principle names the carrier, the operative relation, and the conditions under which the source treats the identity as present. The minimal definition is Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. The strongest recognition evidence in the frozen account is: When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other. A report should distinguish that evidence from a proxy, consequence, or common implementation. It should also state the qualification That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. so that a reader can reproduce the classification rather than infer it from topical resemblance.

Manages Complexity¶

Locke's place-time-kind principle compresses multiple social_sciences_humanities_arts details into a stable diagnostic relation. The source shows both the central mechanism—he defines solidity by appeal to resistance: a body resists "the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.".—and the practical consequence—that which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed. This compression makes cases comparable while leaving parameters, conventions, exceptions, and evidential quality explicit. It is lossy by design: local history and implementation details may be omitted only when they do not alter the defining relation.

Abstract Reasoning¶

Type the carrier. Identify the social_sciences_humanities_arts entities to which the claim applies.
State the relation. Use the source-grounded identity: Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once.
Check operation and conditions. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present.
Demand recognition evidence. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other.
Test variation. Change an implementation or setting while preserving that therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse.
Run the collapse test. Remove the defining operation; if the label still seems equally apt, only a topic or correlate was retained.
Reduce cautiously. When the specialist conditions cannot be carried, route the residual comparison to Pattern.

Knowledge Transfer¶

Within the home domain. Knowledge about Locke's place-time-kind principle transfers literally when a new case preserves the same carrier type, relation, and recognition test. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed. Gideon Yaffe connects the principle to Locke's account of existence over time and to Locke's treatment of "place" as relative to our purposes and to the kind under which we are classifying an entity.

Beyond the home domain. No canonical parent is asserted for Locke's place-time-kind principle. An outside case receives the specialist name only when the same typed roles and rejection conditions can be filled literally; otherwise the comparison remains an analogy pending later graph densification.

Examples¶

Canonical¶

Some authors respond that these cases may trade on the polysemy of terms like "letter" (e.g., shifting between an abstract content and a concrete located item), and that once the relevant sense is fixed the alleged coincidence is less clear. This case is canonical because it supplies a concrete carrier and lets the defining relation be checked rather than merely named.

Mapped back: carrier → the entities in the documented case; operation → Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once; recognition evidence → When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other

Applied / In Practice¶

Giuseppe Spolaore argues that if one accepts widely discussed "pluralist" arguments for the possibility of coincidence in general (for example, standard Wiggins-style cases), then one is strongly pressured to accept more direct counterexamples to Locke's thesis. The applied case shows how the identity is used under a second setting or qualification while keeping the same operative relation.

Mapped back: changed setting → Counterexamples; invariant → Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once; boundary → the case exits the class when that therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse

Structural Tensions¶

T1 — Stable identity versus admissible variation. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Which changes preserve the defining relation, and which replace it?

T2 — Recognition versus proxy. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Does the cited evidence establish the identity or only a correlated sign?

T3 — Definition versus implementation. Commentators commonly read this account of solidity as grounding Locke's treatment of bodies as occupying space in a way that excludes other bodies from the same place, distinguishing bodies from empty space (the void). The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Is the observed implementation constitutive, optional, or merely common?

T4 — Scope versus overextension. He maintains that questions of identity for substances depend on what sort of thing is under discussion (e.g., atoms, masses, living things, persons), but that the initial "place–time–kind" constraint sets a baseline for distinguishing one thing from another. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Can every claimed application fill the same typed roles without metaphor?

T5 — Transfer versus domain accent. If Thin persists through the interweaving process, and if Thick is a genuine object of that same kind, then (Spolaore argues) the result is a pair of distinct same-kind entities that wholly coincide. The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: Does the receiving case instantiate Locke's place-time-kind principle literally, co-instantiate Pattern, or only resemble it?

T6 — Autonomy versus reduction. He defines solidity by appeal to resistance: a body resists "the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.". The tension matters because emphasizing only one side either dissolves the identity or overstates what the evidence and domain conventions warrant.

Diagnostic: What does Locke's place-time-kind principle distinguish that the broader parent Pattern leaves together?

Structural–Framed Character¶

Locke's place-time-kind principle is mixed or framed-leaning. Its structural side is the repeatable organization summarized by Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. Its framed side is the social_sciences_humanities_arts vocabulary that fixes the carrier, evidence, exceptions, and admissible transformations.

Evaluative weight: the identity can be stated descriptively even when applications carry practical stakes. Human-practice dependence: the source-grounded carrier determines whether the relation exists independently or is constituted by a practice. Institutional origin: disciplinary conventions stabilize the name and test. Vocabulary portability: When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. Import versus recognition: literal transfer requires the same mechanism; shape alone is analogy.

Its portable skeleton is Pattern. Its character: a recurring specialist identity whose thin organization can be abstracted, while its operational meaning remains domain-bound.

Structural Core vs. Domain Accent¶

What is skeletal. Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. The stable skeleton is the typed relation expressed in that definition and the entry's recognition and collapse tests. The source identifies these operative conditions: If Thin persists through the interweaving process, and if Thick is a genuine object of that same kind, then (Spolaore argues) the result is a pair of distinct same-kind entities that wholly coincide. He defines solidity by appeal to resistance: a body resists "the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.". It further constrains recognition and variation through: When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other.

What is domain-bound. social sciences humanities arts supplies the operative entities, technical vocabulary, warrants, and exceptions that make Locke's place-time-kind principle literal. Its documented scope includes the condition that That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed. Another bounded application condition is that Gideon Yaffe connects the principle to Locke's account of existence over time and to Locke's treatment of "place" as relative to our purposes and to the kind under which we are classifying an entity. These are not decorative examples; they determine which carrier and evidence can fill the abstraction's roles.

Why no parent is asserted. Removing those specialist details does not currently yield one live catalog node that is a necessary genus for every instance. The entry is therefore approved as unparented rather than attached by topical resemblance. Its collapse evidence remains specific—That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse.—and future graph densification may discover a defensible relation only if it preserves that boundary.

This entry is a kind of Criteria of Individuation.

Approved unparented node. No current live node supplies a defensible necessary genus or structural prerequisite for Locke's place-time-kind principle. The reviewed identity is: Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once. The accelerated suggestion was declined because topical or lexical similarity does not establish hierarchy; the node is admitted without a parent pending later graph densification.
Related reasoning operations. Evidence, representation, comparison, classification, transformation, or evaluation may participate in particular cases, but participation does not make any one of them a necessary parent of every instance.

Relationships to Other Abstractions¶

Current abstraction Locke's place-time-kind principle Domain-specific

Parents (1) — more general patterns this builds on

Locke's place-time-kind principle is a kind of Criteria of Individuation Prime

Locke's principle is precisely a criterion of individuation: same kind plus same place-time fixes numerical identity.

Hierarchy path (1) — routes to 1 parentless root

Locke's place-time-kind principle → Criteria of Individuation

Neighborhood in Abstraction Space¶

Locke's place-time-kind principle sits in a moderately populated region (52^nd percentile for distinctiveness): it has near-neighbors but no dense thicket of look-alikes.

Family — Philosophical Concepts & Thought Experiments (27 abstractions)

Nearest neighbors

Computed from structural-signature embeddings · 2026-10-08

Not to Be Confused With¶

Pattern. The parent omits the specialist differentia. Tell: Can the case establish Locke's place–time–kind principle, also called Locke's thesis, is a claim in the philosophy of John Locke that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, and that no single thing can be in two places at once?
Law of Identity. The law of identity is the substrate-neutral principle that every individuated object, value, or proposition is identical with itself under a fixed interpretation and time, conventionally formalized as a = a. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
Weak ontology (political concept). Make political theory's basic claims about human being and world explicit while holding them as historically situated, contestable commitments rather than unrevisable metaphysical foundations. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
Historicism. Context-bound understanding. Tell: Which entry's carrier, operation, and failure condition are satisfied?
A measurement, proxy, or consequence. Those may provide evidence without being the identity. Tell: Would Locke's place-time-kind principle remain present if the detector or downstream effect changed?
A metaphorical analogue. A similar shape outside social_sciences_humanities_arts lacks the specialist mechanism. Tell: Do the native roles transfer literally, or only the parent Pattern?

References¶

Frozen Wikipedia discovery revision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locke%27s_place-time-kind_principle (revision 1368313505).
Preserved source candidate: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding_%28Troutman_%26_Hayes_1853%29/Book_2/Chapter_27
Preserved source candidate: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10615
Preserved source candidate: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding/Book_II/Chapter_IV
Preserved source candidate: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/
Preserved source candidate: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-personal-identity/
Preserved source candidate: https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Yaffe_LockeonDuration_Identity-Nous.pdf
Preserved source candidate: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/
Preserved source candidate: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/tht3.12

The frozen Wikipedia revision is discovery provenance. The retained source set was reviewed for identity, formal or operational relation, and scope. The encyclopedia's structural synthesis is bounded to those claims; a thin authority surface is recorded as a nonblocking source-strengthening repair rather than concealed.