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Metaphor

Prime #
221
Origin domain
Linguistics & Semiotics
Also from
Rhetoric, Cognitive Science, Philosophy
Aliases
Figurative Language, Figures of Speech, Tropes

Core Idea

Metaphor is a structural mapping from a source domain (typically concrete, familiar, embodied) to a target domain (typically abstract, unfamiliar, or less directly accessible), in which selected relations and inferences from the source are imported into the target to support reasoning, communication, and perception within it. Lakoff-Johnson's framework[1] identified metaphor not as ornamental language but as a cross-domain projection of structure that organizes how the target can be thought about at all. Every metaphor names what is mapped, what is not mapped, and what inferential work the mapping is doing.

The classical distinction between conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) and earlier rhetorical traditions (Richards 1936, Black 1962) hinges on the claim that metaphor is constitutive of thought, not merely decorative. Where rhetoric treated metaphor as a stylistic choice[2], cognitive linguistics treats it as the fundamental scaffold for abstract reasoning[3].

Modern approaches to metaphor further incorporate conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner 2002), which extends single-domain mappings to multi-domain compressions where novel emergent structure arises in the blend[4]. This theory challenges the assumption that metaphor simply copies structure wholesale, highlighting instead the creative and generative dimension of metaphorical reasoning.

How would you explain it like I'm…

Saying One Thing Is Another

A metaphor is when you talk about one thing as if it were another to help someone understand it. If you say 'time is money,' you're not really paying for minutes — you mean we use time the way we use money: save it, spend it, waste it. The trick borrows ideas from something familiar to explain something harder.

Explaining by Comparing

A metaphor is a way of understanding one thing by mapping it onto another, more familiar thing. When we say "life is a journey," we borrow ideas from journeys — having a destination, getting lost, taking detours — and use them to think about life. Some parts of the map fit and others don't, and metaphors aren't just for poetry: scientists think we use them all the time to reason about ideas we can't see or touch directly.

Metaphor

A metaphor is a structural mapping from a *source* domain — typically something concrete, familiar, or embodied — to a *target* domain that is more abstract or unfamiliar. Selected relations from the source get imported into the target so we can reason about it. In "argument is war," ideas like attacking a position, defending a claim, and winning a debate are all carried over from combat into discussion. A metaphor always implies what gets mapped, what is deliberately left out, and what inferential work the mapping does. Lakoff and Johnson's 1980 *Metaphors We Live By* argued that metaphor isn't just a stylistic flourish — it's a basic scaffold that makes abstract thinking possible.

 

A metaphor is a structural mapping from a *source domain* (typically concrete, familiar, embodied) to a *target domain* (typically abstract, unfamiliar, or less directly accessible), in which selected relations and inferences from the source are imported into the target to support reasoning, communication, and perception within it. Lakoff and Johnson's 1980 framework reframed metaphor as not ornamental language but a cross-domain projection of structure that organizes how the target can be thought about at all — "argument is war" or "time is money" are not phrases but conceptual scaffolds. Every metaphor names what is mapped, what is not mapped, and what inferential work the mapping is doing. The classical distinction between conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and earlier rhetorical traditions (Richards, 1936; Black, 1962) turns on the claim that metaphor is *constitutive* of thought, not decorative. Conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) extends the picture from single-domain mappings to multi-domain compressions, where novel emergent structure can arise in the blend itself — highlighting metaphor's creative, generative dimension rather than mere wholesale copying.

Structural Signature

A use of language, image, or action is metaphorical when each of the following holds:

  • The source domain — Two conceptual domains are in play: a source (the domain from which structure is drawn) and a target (the domain into which structure is projected)[5].
  • The target domain — The domain being understood through the lens of the source; typically abstract, novel, or less directly accessible.
  • The structural mapping — A subset of roles and relations in the source map to roles and relations in the target. The mapping is partial by design — not every feature of the source is imported[6].
  • The conceptual entailments — The mapped relations preserve patterns of inference: if A-in-source implies B-in-source, the mapping licenses analogous A'-in-target implies B'-in-target[7].
  • The cognitive-linguistic vs rhetorical variant — Cognitive accounts treat metaphor as constitutive of understanding; rhetorical accounts treat it as a technique of persuasion and style. Both are operative, but the cognitive level is explanatorily prior.
  • The dead-vs-live metaphor distinction — Live metaphors command attention; dead or conventionalized metaphors ("grasping an idea," "leg of the table") fade into transparency and become literal in everyday use[8].

What It Is Not

  • Not mere simile. "X is like Y" can be stated without importing inferential structure; a metaphor is doing work inside the target by projecting the source's relations.
  • Not decoration. Stripping metaphor from technical discourse often removes the very scaffolding that enables the reasoning, not just the prose style.
  • Not analogy in general. Analogy is the genus; metaphor is the species deployed pervasively in ordinary cognition and language. All metaphors are analogies; not all analogies are metaphors in the linguistic/cognitive sense[9].
  • Not identity. "Time is money" does not claim time is money; it claims the time-domain can be reasoned about using a money-shaped structure (spending, saving, wasting, investing).
  • Not faithful representation. A metaphor's power comes from its selectivity. Attempting to import everything from the source produces contradictions or absurdity (the classic "all models are wrong" problem at the level of conceptualization itself).
  • Common misclassification. Treating dead or conventional metaphors as literal and then being surprised when the apparent literalness breaks down at the edges.

Broad Use

  • Linguistics and cognitive science
    • Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson): systematic mappings like ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MONEY, LIFE IS A JOURNEY.
    • Image-schema theory; embodied cognition.
  • Science and mathematics
    • The atom-as-solar-system metaphor (useful but misleading at the edges); wave/particle dual metaphors.
    • "Flow" in fluid dynamics borrowed for networks, traffic, information.
    • Category theory formalizes structural mappings that scientific metaphors approximate informally.
    • Hesse's (1966) philosophy of science emphasizes metaphor's constitutive role in theoretical reasoning[10].
  • Philosophy
    • Metaphor as a mode of understanding, not reducible to literal paraphrase (Ricoeur, Black, Searle).
  • Rhetoric and literature
    • Persuasion through frame-setting; metaphors that ship an argument's structure along with its surface.
  • Design and interface
    • "Desktop," "folder," "trash": metaphors that import source-domain actions into the target (file system) making it tractable.
  • Therapy and medicine
    • "Body as battleground," "cancer as journey": metaphors that shape patient experience, prognosis, and clinical communication.
  • AI and NLP
    • Metaphor detection and interpretation in computational linguistics; metaphor-based reasoning in knowledge representation[11].
  • Education
    • Pedagogical analogies and metaphors for scaffolding unfamiliar concepts; the tight relationship between analogical reasoning and metaphor in learning contexts[12].

Clarity

Metaphor clarifies by offering a pre-organized skeleton for a domain that would otherwise be inarticulate. The source brings inference patterns the target lacks. The cost is that the skeleton's shape colors everything perceived through it — so clarity here means also naming what the metaphor is not importing, and under what conditions the fit breaks. Semino's (2008) work on metaphor in discourse demonstrates how metaphor choice in clinical or journalistic contexts shapes meaning and perception[13].

Manages Complexity

  • Reuses inferential scaffolding: instead of constructing fresh reasoning patterns, the target inherits patterns the source already supports.
  • Enables communication about the unfamiliar: listeners who know the source can rapidly bootstrap an operational grasp of the target.
  • Compresses high-dimensional structure into navigable imagery (spatial metaphors for abstract relations; JOURNEY for life, career, inquiry).
  • Stabilizes a shared vocabulary: once "market" or "ecosystem" or "flow" takes hold, parties can coordinate without rebuilding foundational concepts.

Abstract Reasoning

Metaphor trains a reasoner to ask:

  • What is the source, and what is the target?
  • Which relations of the source are being mapped, and which are being deliberately excluded?
  • What inferences does the mapping license? Which should it not license?
  • Where does the metaphor break? What features of the target are absent from the source — and do those features matter here?
  • Does the metaphor smuggle in commitments (normative, causal, ontological) that should be examined, not inherited?
  • Is a different metaphor available that would highlight different aspects of the target?

Knowledge Transfer

Role mappings across domains:

  • Source domain ↔ base / vehicle / analog / donor / "the like"
  • Target domain ↔ topic / tenor / subject / recipient / "the thing"
  • Mapping ↔ structural analogy / morphism / analogy base / ground of the comparison
  • Licensed inference ↔ imported entailment / structural prediction / analogical transfer
  • Breakpoint ↔ disanalogy / where the metaphor fails / metaphor-literal boundary
  • Competing metaphor ↔ alternative frame / reframe / rival vehicle
  • Dead metaphor ↔ conventionalized mapping / lexicalized analog / frozen frame

Examples

  • Formal/abstract: LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Lakoff-Johnson 1980 canonical example. Source domain (JOURNEY): travelers, paths, obstacles, destinations. Target domain (LIFE): people, life-paths, problems, goals. The mapping projects inferences: reaching a destination implies completing a life; obstacles on the path imply difficulties in life. Entailments include the notion of choice-points (forks in the road) and irreversibility (you cannot go back). Mapped back: What is not imported? The metaphor does not typically include physical fatigue, expense, or the option of choosing not to travel. Where it breaks: life does not have a single destination; multiple destinations may coexist or shift.

  • Applied/industry: BUSINESS IS WAR. Lakoff (2008) critiques the prevalence and cognitive consequences of war metaphors in strategic thinking[14]. Source domain (WAR): combatants, terrain, victory, defeat, casualties, alliances. Target domain (BUSINESS): competitors, markets, market share, business failure, partnerships. The mapping produces language ("competitive battlefield," "market share," "winning strategy," "vanquish competitors") and reasoning patterns (zero-sum thinking, adversarial framing). Entailments include the notion that business success requires eliminating rivals. Mapped back: What is excluded? Collaboration, mutual benefit, and the notion of expanding the total market. The metaphor subtly reframes cooperation as weakness. Lakoff argues that alternative metaphors (BUSINESS IS GARDENING, BUSINESS IS MUSIC) yield different strategic insights and invite different behavior.

Structural Tensions and Failure Modes

  • T1: Cognitive vs Rhetorical Metaphor.

    • Structural tension: Cognitive accounts (Lakoff, Johnson, Kövecses) treat metaphor as constitutive of thought and embodied reasoning. Rhetorical accounts (classical tradition) treat metaphor as a persuasive technique applied to otherwise-formed thoughts. Both operate; the question is which is primary.
    • Common failure mode: Assuming that metaphors are chosen strategically (rhetorical view) when they are often inherited unconsciously (cognitive view), or vice versa.

  • T2: Conceptual Metaphor vs Conceptual Blending.

    • Structural tension: Lakoff-Johnson conceptual metaphor theory posits a single unidirectional mapping (source to target). Fauconnier-Turner conceptual blending allows multi-domain combinations in which emergent structure arises in a "blended space" that inherits from multiple input domains.
    • Common failure mode: Treating all metaphorical reasoning as simple domain-mapping when some phenomena require multi-space integration and emergent conceptualization.

  • T3: Cross-Cultural Universals vs Contextual Variation.

    • Structural tension: Some metaphors appear universal (UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, TIME IS SPACE). Others are deeply cultural or era-specific (DIGITAL TIME, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE). The degree of universality is contested.
    • Common failure mode: Assuming metaphors are either universal laws of cognition or purely arbitrary, when the reality is structured variation: universals in the type of source domain (embodied, spatial, kinesthetic) but variation in the specific vehicle chosen.

  • T4: Dead Metaphor vs Live Metaphor.

    • Structural tension: Live metaphors command attention and generate novel inferences. Dead metaphors fade into semantic transparency. But the boundary is not clean: a metaphor can be partially dead (obvious to experts, fresh to novices) or revivable (suddenly salient in new contexts).
    • Common failure mode: Either missing the inferential work done by dead metaphors (treating "grasping an idea" as literal) or over-reading novel inference into a conventionalized phrase.

  • T5: Metaphor in Scientific Theory.

    • Structural tension: Hesse (1966) and subsequent philosophers of science argue that all theoretical language relies on metaphor, yet metaphors can mislead (the atom-as-solar-system breaks down quantitatively; the mind-as-computer breaks down empirically). How much insight and how much artifact comes from the metaphor?
    • Common failure mode: Treating scientific metaphors as literal truth (assuming neurons really "fire," or markets really "correct" themselves) and building policy on the metaphor rather than the underlying model.

  • T6: NLP and Metaphor Detection.

    • Structural tension: Computational approaches to metaphor (Shutova 2013, others) must operationalize what counts as metaphorical. Statistical methods learn when a word is used non-literally but struggle with dead metaphors, cultural variation, and the interaction between metaphor and context.
    • Common failure mode: False positives (flagging conventional language as metaphor) or false negatives (missing subtle transfers of meaning).

Structural–Framed Character

Metaphor is a hybrid on the structural–framed spectrum, and it leans structural with a light frame on top. Part of it is a bare pattern — a structured mapping from a source domain to a target domain, in which selected relations and inferences from the source are carried over to organize thinking about the target. Part of it is a vocabulary about language and meaning inherited from linguistics and semiotics.

The structural side dominates. The cross-domain projection of structure — source, target, and a systematic correspondence that licenses inferences — is a relational pattern with no evaluative weight, and it transfers unchanged across analogical reasoning in science, problem-solving by analogy, and everyday conceptual mappings like "argument is war" or "time is money." It names a structure genuinely present whenever one domain is understood in terms of another, rather than an imported perspective. The light frame comes from its origin: the framing in terms of language, expression, and the source/target vocabulary gives it a linguistic accent, even though the mapping itself is not specifically verbal. That accent is thin relative to the underlying mapping structure, placing it toward the structural side of the middle.

Substrate Independence

Metaphor is a highly substrate-independent prime — composite 4 / 5 on the substrate-independence scale. At its core it is a structural cross-domain mapping — selected relations and inferences carried from a source onto a target while preserving relational structure — and that signature is fully substrate-agnostic. The transfer is real across cognitive science, rhetoric, the Lakoff-Johnson formalism, visual and artistic metaphor, and formal concept mapping. What holds it just below the top is that the examples concentrate in linguistic contexts, so the wider visual and formal reach is shown but not as densely populated.

  • Composite substrate independence — 4 / 5
  • Domain breadth — 4 / 5
  • Structural abstraction — 5 / 5
  • Transfer evidence — 4 / 5

Relationships to Other Primes

One-hop neighborhood: parents above, mutual partners to the right, children below.Metaphorsubsumption: AnalogyAnalogysubsumption: Metaphor (Visual/Artistic)Metaphor (Visua…

Parents (1) — more general patterns this builds on

  • Metaphor is a kind of Analogy

    Analogy is the general pattern of structural mapping between two domains in which relational roles align so that inferences in the source become candidate inferences in the target. Metaphor is the specific case in which the source domain is typically concrete and embodied, the target is typically abstract, and the mapping organizes how the target can be thought about and talked about at all. It inherits analogy's relational-alignment machinery but commits additionally to constitutive cognitive-linguistic projection — a specialization of analogy applied to thought and discourse.

Children (1) — more specific cases that build on this

  • Metaphor (Visual/Artistic) is a kind of Metaphor

    Visual-artistic metaphor is a specialization of metaphor in which the cross-domain mapping is carried by visual form, imagery, or compositional relation rather than by linguistic expression. It inherits metaphor's general structure of importing selected relations and inferences from a source domain into a target domain to support reasoning, communication, or perception, and specializes by fixing the medium of the mapping to visual transfer: one visual form stands for or illuminates another through perceived similarity, structural correspondence, or cultural convention. The conceptual content travels through the image rather than through the word.

Path to root: Metaphor → Analogy → Comparison

Neighborhood in Abstraction Space

Metaphor sits in a moderately populated region (42nd percentile for distinctiveness): it has near-neighbors but no dense thicket of synonyms.

Family — Language, Symbol & Cultural Form (32 primes)

Nearest neighbors

Computed from structural-signature embeddings · 2026-05-29

Not to Be Confused With

Metaphor must be distinguished from Metaphor (Visual/Artistic), despite their kinship. Both are structural mappings, but they operate on different substrates and with different purposes. Metaphor generally (the prime) is a conceptual-linguistic mapping in which abstract target domains are rendered intelligible through the inherited structure of concrete source domains—"life is a journey" makes the abstract domain of human experience navigable by projecting the spatial and temporal scaffolding of physical travel. Metaphor (Visual/Artistic) is the instantiation of metaphorical mapping through visual, plastic, material, or performative media—the artist who paints a figure dissolving into water is rendering metaphorical thought visible through pigment and composition. The distinction is substrate-level and functional. A poet who writes "time is a thief" is doing conceptual metaphor; a painter who renders time as a robed figure with a scythe is doing visual metaphor. Both compress the same structural insight (time has agency; it takes things from us), but one lives in language, the other in visual form. A conceptual metaphor has no inherent visual form; a visual metaphor always instantiates a conceptual mapping through material choices. The relationship is that visual metaphor realizes conceptual metaphors in perceptual media, while conceptual metaphor grounds visual metaphors in cognitive structures that transcend the image.

Metaphor is also distinct from Analogy, though they share relational structure. Analogy is a bidirectional or multidirectional comparison of structure across domains that licenses inference without necessarily claiming identity. When a scientist argues "atoms are like solar systems," analogy licenses the inference that atoms have nucleus and orbiting bodies, but preserves the distinctness—atoms are like solar systems, not identical to them. Metaphor, by contrast, uses the identity claim ("life is a journey") to do cognitive work—the metaphor absorbs the target domain into the source's structure; analogy compares structures while preserving domain boundaries. Analogy can be stated as "A is to B as C is to D"; metaphor is directional and absorptive: "C is D." Consequently, analogy is more epistemically cautious (drawing inferences while preserving distinctness), while metaphor is more cognitively productive (reorganizing understanding). Analogy says "these domains have similar structures"; metaphor says "this domain is that one for thinking purposes." This difference has real consequences: analogical reasoning is useful for transfer and learning; metaphorical reasoning is constitutive of how a domain gets conceptualized in the first place.

Metaphor is distinct from Framing, though both shape perception. Framing is the selective activation of dimensions or aspects of a situation—what is foregrounded, what recedes, how boundaries are drawn, which attributes count. A situation can be framed as "a business opportunity" or "a moral crisis"; the same situation receives different structure through frame choice. Metaphor, by contrast, imports inferential relations and entailments from a source domain into a target. When ARGUMENT is framed as WAR, the metaphor doesn't just highlight conflict; it licenses inferences—if you win arguments, you've "defeated" opponents; if you lose, you've "surrendered." Framing shapes salience; metaphor shapes inference. A situation can be framed without metaphor (highlighting certain facts and downplaying others without importing cross-domain structure), and a metaphor can operate within multiple frames. Framing is selective emphasis; metaphor is structural transfer.

Metaphor is also distinct from Composition, the arrangement of visual or spatial elements into unified wholes. Composition is an organizational principle—how elements are positioned, balanced, and arranged to create visual coherence. A composition can depict a metaphor visually, but composition itself is not metaphorical unless the arrangement projects relational structure from another domain. A triptych arranged with a central panel flanked by side panels is a compositional choice; if the arrangement represents time as a present (center) flanked by past and future, composition has become metaphorical. Composition shapes visibility and unity; metaphor relates conceptual domains through structural projection.

Finally, metaphor is distinct from Perspective, the spatial or viewpoint position from which an object or scene is observed or represented. Perspective shapes what is visible, how it appears, and which aspects are accessible from a given vantage point. A scene viewed from above looks different from the same scene viewed from ground level; perspective is the anchor-point of observation. Metaphor, by contrast, relates conceptual domains—it is not about where you are standing but about which conceptual structure you are borrowing to understand something unfamiliar. Perspective is a spatial or observational stance; metaphor is a conceptual stance. One can change perspective without changing metaphor (viewing a journey from the traveler's standpoint or from overhead), and one can change metaphor without changing perspective (describing life as a journey or as a building). The two can reinforce each other—a first-person perspective on a journey-metaphor for life heightens immersion—but they are structurally independent.

Solution Archetypes

Solution archetypes in the catalog that build on this prime — directly (this prime is a source ingredient) or as a related prime.

Also a related prime in 5 archetypes

Notes

DP-23 draft applying DP-04 protocol. Six foundational core-idea sentences, six role-phrases in italics in Structural Signature section, six "What It Is Not" bullets. Five major structural tensions (T1–T5) covering simile-metaphor distinction, asymmetric comparison, cross-cultural patterns, dead similes, NLP detection, and scientific explanation. Tight pair with #219 analogy — simile performs surface-attribute transfer via explicit marker; analogy performs deep relational mapping without marker. Thematic link to #221 metaphor (pilot) and #222 metaphor_visual_artistic; simile, metaphor, and analogy form a continuum of figurative-comparative devices distinguished primarily by marker presence and depth of relational mapping. The iconography transfer in Knowledge Transfer section is structurally faithful because icon design and linguistic simile share the core operation: marker-mediated single-attribute transfer from familiar vehicle to unfamiliar tenor. Aristotle Rhetoric 3.4 and Poetics provide the canonical origin for the simile-metaphor distinction, which later rhetoric and stylistics elaborated through Richards (tenor-vehicle), Black (marker distinctness), Lakoff-Johnson (conceptual mapping), and contemporary cognitive-linguistic work. Origin: rhetoric, with substantial contributions from literature (imagery and figurative-language theory), linguistics and semiotics (formal analysis of comparative constructions), and cognitive science (processing-time and comprehension studies of simile vs. metaphor).

References

[1] Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press. Cognitive theory of metaphor as central to semantic change and conceptual structure; metaphorical extensions as motivated by embodied cognition; foundational for cognitive semantics. CROSS-DP-22. ↩

[2] Richards, I. A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Oxford University Press, 1936. Introduced the terminology of "tenor" and "vehicle" that became standard in figurative-language theory. Applies to metaphor and simile; see metaphor tight-pair. CROSS-DP-23 metaphor. ↩

[3] Black, M. (1962). Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy. Cornell University Press. Interaction view of metaphor: metaphor produces meaning through interaction between subsidiary and principal subjects, not through simple substitution; basis for analyzing irreducible visual metaphor. ↩

[4] Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. Basic Books, 2002. The canonical statement of conceptual blending theory; comprehensive coverage of integration networks, optimality principles, and applications across language, mathematics, science, and culture; extensively analyzes the Buddhist-monk and other canonical examples. ↩

[5] Lakoff, George. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. Develops prototype theory and categorization: abstractions (categories) are formed by retaining prototypical features and dropping variation; abstraction is natural, gradient-based, and purpose-relative rather than strictly logical. ↩

[6] Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press. Johnson The Body in the Mind. ↩

[7] Kövecses, Zoltán. Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2010. Standard contemporary textbook on metaphor structure and the metaphor-simile distinction; distinguishes metaphor's identity claim from simile's marker-preserved distinctness. CROSS-DP-23 metaphor. ↩

[8] Searle, J. R. (1979). A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (pp. 1–29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Establishes the five-fold classification of illocutionary acts including declarations — utterances that change the world by representing it as changed — generalizing Austin's performatives. ↩

[9] Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155–170. Structure-mapping theory of analogy: the alignment rule is to preserve higher-order relational structure while dropping surface features, distinguishing analogy from literal similarity and other comparison readings. ↩

[10] Hesse, M. B. (1966). Models and Analogies in Science. University of Notre Dame Press. Hesse Models and Analogies in Science. ↩

[11] Shutova, E. (2013). Metaphor identification using verb and noun clustering. Computational Linguistics, 39(2), 1–36. Shutova metaphor processing computational. ↩

[12] Cameron, L. (2003). Metaphor in Educational Discourse. Continuum. Cameron Metaphor in Educational Discourse. ↩

[13] Semino, Elena. Metaphor in Discourse. Cambridge University Press, 2008. Discourse-pragmatic analysis of figurative language including simile in extended contexts; addresses how simile direction and topicalization affect rhetorical force. ↩

[14] Lakoff, G. (2008). The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st-Century American Politics with an 18th-Century Brain. Viking. Lakoff The Political Mind. ↩

[15] Gibbs, Raymond W. (Ed.). The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge University Press, 2008. Comprehensive review of metaphor and figurative language in cognitive science; includes simile and its cognitive processing. CROSS-DP-23 metaphor.