Psychology & Cognitive Science

167 domain-specific abstractions whose origin domain is Psychology & Cognitive Science.

• Assembly Bonus Effect — The small-group finding that on the right task types a group's output exceeds even its best member's predicted performance — a positive interaction residual from mutual error-correction and partial-insight combination that no aggregation of individual scores captures.
• Attachment — A behavioral-motivational system that regulates proximity between a vulnerable individual and a protective figure — a safe haven sought under threat and a secure base enabling exploration — whose learned expectations form an internal working model that classifies into stable attachment styles.
• Attentional Bias — The systematic tilt in how finite attention is allocated across the perceptual field — pulled by anxiety, reward history, depression, or expertise rather than sensory salience — a property of the perceiver, at perceptual selection, upstream of judgment.
• Attribute Substitution — The dual-process mechanism behind a whole family of judgment biases: when a target attribute is hard to assess, the mind unconsciously swaps in an easier, correlated attribute and reports its value — producing a confident but directionally biased answer.
• Authority Bias — Decompose any act of deference into a content term and a source-cue term, and flag the upward tilt as bias whenever authority signals — titles, uniforms, confident bearing — inflate credence beyond the authority's genuine expertise in the specific claim.
• Automation Bias — The human-factors regularity in which operators over-weight an automated system's outputs and under-weight contradicting evidence, so the human-automation team can perform worse on rare anomalies than the unaided operator would — through commission errors (acting on a false recommendation) or omission errors (staying passive when the system is silent).
• Availability Heuristic — The systematic human tendency to judge how frequent or probable an event is by how easily instances of it come to mind, so retrieval fluency stands in for frequency and estimates track what is memorable rather than what is common.
• Backfire Effect — The phenomenon in which evidence contradicting an identity-bound belief produces not revision but firmer commitment, because the challenge is processed as an attack on self and parried by counter-arguing that rehearses and strengthens the original position.
• Barnum Effect — The tendency to accept vague, high-base-rate personality descriptions as strikingly accurate accounts of oneself when framed as personally intended — because the reader privately narrows a statement that actually fits almost everyone.
• Base Rate Fallacy — The systematic human tendency to underweight or ignore the prior probability of a hypothesis when vivid, specific evidence is available, so a posterior estimate collapses toward the likelihood instead of tracking Bayes' rule.
• Belief Bias — The tendency to judge an argument's logical validity by the believability of its conclusion rather than its form — a cheap plausibility check displacing an effortful logical-form check — exposed by crossing validity against believability in a 2×2.
• Ben Franklin Effect — The finding that doing a voluntary, costly favor for someone increases the doer's liking of them — the causal arrow running from act to attitude, as cognitive dissonance is cheaply resolved by revising the attitude to fit what one has already done.
• Bezold Effect — The color-perception phenomenon in which a target's apparent hue shifts toward a finely interspersed surround rather than away from it — assimilation, gated by whether the surround falls inside the visual system's spatial integration window.
• Bias Blind Spot — Explain why people spot biases in others but not themselves — self-assessment defaults to an introspective channel (a felt sense of careful reasoning) that is constitutively blind to the automatic biases the behavioral channel reveals in others, so awareness of a bias does not close the gap.
• Birthday-Number Effect — The small implicit preference for numbers in one's own birth date over neutral ones — a valence-transfer effect from the implicit-egotism family, real only in the residual that survives controls for a number's baseline pleasantness and cohort base rates.
• Central Route Processing — The Elaboration Likelihood Model's pathway in which a recipient with both motivation and ability scrutinizes a message's argument substance, producing attitude change that is more durable, counter-persuasion-resistant, and behaviorally predictive than cue-driven peripheral change.
• Certainty Effect — Capture the way people overweight an outcome made fully certain relative to one merely probable of equal expected value, so the move from 0.99 to 1.0 commands a disproportionate premium the arithmetic does not justify.
• Cheerleader Effect — Explain why a face is rated more attractive in a group than alone by ensemble coding — the visual system assimilates each individual percept toward the group's averaged, and thus more attractive, mean.
• Choice-Supportive Bias — Explain why we misremember past decisions in our own favor: dissonance reduction rewrites the stored memory so the chosen option looks better and the rejected ones worse than the evidence actually showed at the time of choice.
• Common Fate — Group visual elements that change together — moving, flickering, or co-varying synchronously — into one perceived object, on the inference that things sharing a fate usually share an origin.
• Comparative Self-Assessment Crossover — When people estimate their standing from their own felt ability while underweighting the peer distribution, perceived task difficulty selects the direction of error: above average on easy tasks and below average on hard ones.
• Configural Processing — A perceiver recognizes an over-learned whole through relations among its parts and feeds that whole-level representation back onto part processing, so canonical arrangement improves constituent recognition and exposes relational violations that isolated features miss.
• Congruence Bias — The reasoning bias of designing only tests that could confirm a favored hypothesis rather than tests that discriminate it from equally plausible rivals — a failure of test design, not evidence evaluation, that leaves a probe locally valid but globally non-diagnostic because its likelihood ratio sits near one.
• Conjunction Fallacy — Detect a probability-judgment error by watching for a more detailed scenario being rated more probable than the simpler scenario it is a strict subset of — the signature of resemblance quietly standing in for probability.
• Conservatism Bias — Capture the tendency of people to revise a probability judgment less than Bayes' rule prescribes when evidence arrives — the reported posterior landing short of the correct one, anchored too close to the prior — measured as a signed gap against an explicit Bayesian benchmark.
• Context-Dependent Memory — The finding that recall improves when the retrieval context matches the encoding context — because incidental cues are bound into the trace and retrieval probability tracks cue overlap, so a mismatch produces a cue deficit rather than lost content.
• Courtesy Bias — The questioner-directed tendency of respondents to shift reported answers toward what this immediate asker appears to want — inflating positives and suppressing negatives, scaling with status asymmetry and politeness norms, and correctable only by removing the questioner.
• Crab Mentality — Diagnose in-group sabotage of a member who rises above the shared baseline by the cost-without-gain signature — a voluntarily costly leveling act yielding no individual gain — which reveals asymmetric relative-position concern under identity threat rather than competition.
• Crespi Effect — Read operant behavior after a reward change as a discrepancy-driven transient rather than an absolute-value response: animals shifted up overshoot same-reward controls (elation) and animals shifted down undershoot them (depression), calibrated to the signed gap between delivery and a recalibrating expectation.
• Cross-Race Effect — Explain why people recognize own-group faces better than other-group faces by exposure-tuned encoding granularity — a system trained densely on one face category individuates it finely and codes sparse categories coarsely, driven by training statistics, not biology.
• Declinism — Believe the past was better and the future will be worse — even against the measured data — via a self-reinforcing loop of rosy retrospection on the past, negativity- and recency-weighted evaluation of the present, and naive extrapolation forward.
• Decoy Effect — Add a third option that is worse than one existing choice on every dimension but not strictly worse than the other, and preferences shift toward the option that dominates the decoy — even though the decoy itself is never chosen.
• Default Effect — Shift the distribution of choices without changing any option by flipping which alternative is preselected as the no-action outcome, because a stack of retention mechanisms makes people disproportionately keep whatever the default is.
• Diderot Effect — Explain a run of purchases as a single induced restructuring, in which one item falling outside your existing ensemble resets the reference standard and triggers a cascade of upgrades until coherence is restored at a costlier tier.
• Distinction Bias — Overweight attribute differences between options evaluated side by side relative to the weight those differences carry when each option is met alone, so preferences formed at the point of choice (joint mode) overpredict the utility actually experienced in use (separate mode).
• Distraction — The involuntary capture of an agent's scarce attention by a salient secondary stimulus that wins a bottleneck competition against the primary task by its own salience rather than the agent's intent, imposing a performance cost plus recovery time.
• Door-in-the-Face Technique — A sequential compliance strategy in which a requester first makes a large request expected to be refused, then retreats to a smaller one — the target actually wanted — obtaining higher compliance than the small request cold, chiefly through reciprocal concession and perceptual contrast.
• Dual-process Theory — Models cognition as the interaction of a fast, automatic, associative process (System 1) supplying default responses and a slow, effortful, rule-based process (System 2) selectively recruited to endorse or override them under conflict, novelty, or stakes.
• Dunbar's Number — Cap the working set of warm, mutually-tracked social bonds an individual can hold at roughly 150, because pairwise-relationship tracking scales as O(N-squared) against a fixed neocortical budget, with nested inner shells at ~5, ~15, and ~50.
• Duration Neglect — The judgment bias in which the length of a bounded experience contributes negligible weight to its retrospective evaluation, which is instead built from a representative peak and the final moments (the peak-end rule) — so remembered utility systematically diverges from the integral of what was lived.
• Effort Justification — After personally expending meaningful effort to attain or create an outcome, a self-evaluating agent raises that outcome's attributed value to reconcile the cost of the effort with the belief that the pursuit was worthwhile.
• Egocentric Bias — Trace a family of social-judgment miscalibrations to one asymmetry — the self's mental contents are available by default while other minds must be inferred at cost — so the self serves as an anchor from which adjustment is systematically insufficient.
• Einstellung Effect — Diagnose a skilled solver's failure on a near-surface variant not as missing knowledge but as retrieval-driven blocking — the first-cued familiar method is retrieved, judged adequate, and halts search before a simpler dominating alternative is ever compared.
• Elaboration Likelihood — Predict the route by which a persuasive message changes attitudes from the recipient's motivation and ability — a central route scrutinising argument quality when both are high, a peripheral route riding surface cues otherwise — with central-route attitudes proving far more durable.
• Elaborative Encoding — At learning time, bind new material to multiple meaningful relations in an existing knowledge structure so the resulting memory trace can later be reached through more retrieval paths than a surface-only encoding.
• Emotional Response — The coordinated four-stage reaction an affective agent produces when a stimulus is appraised as significant for its goals: appraisal triggers a bundled physiological-expressive-motivational package that then biases subsequent attention, memory, and choice.
• End-of-History Illusion — Explain why people at any age acknowledge large past-decade change yet forecast far less future change — an asymmetry in which vivid episodic contrasts underwrite recall while the future self, lacking any episodic record, is built by minimal edits to the present self.
• Ensemble Coding — Extract a statistical summary of a set of items in parallel — faster than any individual item can be encoded — and treat that summary as the default percept of the group.
• Epiphany — A discrete moment in which an unsolved problem suddenly reorganizes in the mind so the answer is manifest — not the acquisition of a new fact but a restructuring of the framing through which fixed facts are read, arriving abruptly across an impasse and seeming obvious in hindsight.
• Exaggerated Expectation — Lift the expectation-realization gap out as a third measurable quantity carrying a stable sign — so a forecaster's systematic, directional miss across a class of events is diagnosed as a defect in the forecasting machinery, not random noise.
• Face Superiority Effect — A facial feature is recognized faster and more accurately embedded in a complete upright face than in isolation — a counter-featural advantage whose direction proves that a configural, whole-based processing system, not part-by-part analysis, mediates recognition.
• False Fame Effect — The finding that a previously seen non-famous name is later misjudged as famous — because prior exposure produces real processing fluency that, once the memory of its source is lost, gets misattributed to fame rather than to having been seen.
• False-Uniqueness Effect — The social-cognition finding that people underestimate how common their own virtues are among peers, biasing peer-prevalence estimates downward for positive, identity-relevant traits in order to preserve a sense of distinctiveness and positive self-evaluation.
• Fan Effect — The memory finding that verifying a stored fact about a concept gets slower and less accurate as more other facts are attached to it, because a fixed activation budget spread across a concept's associations ('fan') leaves each one less to cross the recognition threshold.
• Fitts's Law — Predict how long an aimed reach takes as a logarithmic function of target distance over target width — MT = a + b·log₂(2D/W) — treating the movement as transmission across a finite-throughput motor channel.
• Flynn Effect — Track the sustained cohort-to-cohort rise in raw intelligence-test scores — strongest on abstract fluid-reasoning tasks and largely hidden by periodic renorming — together with its later plateau or reversal in some populations.
• Focusing Effect (Focusing Illusion) — Systematically overweight whatever attribute attention currently rests on when judging a complex multi-attribute target, so the focused feature dominates the constructed evaluation far above its real causal contribution while everything below the attentional threshold recedes.
• Foot-in-the-Door Technique — A sequential influence tactic in which securing a small, self-attributed first request raises compliance with a larger related request later — because complying revises the target's self-concept ('I'm the kind of person who does this'), against which the second ask is then evaluated.
• Frequency Illusion — Explain the felt surge in a thing's frequency right after you first notice it as a change in the perceiver, not the world — selective attention now logs real occurrences while confirmation-biased memory counts hits and discards misses.
• Functional Fixedness — The cognitive bias in which encoding an object under its conventional category label crowds out inspection of its raw physical properties, blocking the solver from a non-conventional use the problem needs and the object's properties would permit.
• Gambler's Fallacy — Catch the error of believing a run of one outcome makes the opposite 'due' on the next trial — imposing the law of large numbers' aggregate balance as a within-trial obligation — by first screening whether the trial process is independent.
• Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect — A reader who finds a source riddled with errors in their own field turns the page and trusts it on an unfamiliar topic, because the error was filed as topic-specific news rather than propagated to a source-level prior.
• Generation Effect — The memory regularity that material a learner actively produces from a cue is remembered better than identical material read passively, because generation forces activation of prior knowledge and wires a richer, more connected memory trace at encoding.
• Google Effect — The memory phenomenon in which people encode where information can be retrieved rather than its content whenever they expect it to stay available in an external digital store — a substitution of address for substance, not a general loss of memory.
• Halo Effect — Explain why a judge's positive impression of one salient attribute of a target inflates ratings of its structurally unrelated attributes — treating a same-judge same-target rating correlation as an upper bound on, not an estimate of, the true trait correlation.
• Hedonic Treadmill — The pattern in which subjective well-being rises or falls after a life change but drifts back toward a temperamentally stable baseline over weeks to years, because a gain-control mechanism recalibrates affective evaluation against recent experience.
• Hindsight Bias — The tendency, once an outcome is known, to inflate its perceived prior probability and misremember one's own judgment as closer to it than it was, because outcome knowledge is folded into the memory of the prior situation and reconstructs rather than retrieves it.
• Hostile Media Effect — The perception finding that opposing partisans exposed to the same neutral coverage of a contested issue each judge it biased against their own side — via selective categorization and different standards, amplified by prior commitment — so symmetric complaint is a signal of balance, not slant.
• Humphrey's Law — Consciously attending to a well-practiced automatic skill degrades it — declarative monitoring reinvested into a proceduralized pathway fragments and slows execution, which is why the expert chokes while the novice, who has no such pathway, does not.
• Identity Threat — The anticipated devaluation of a positively-valued self-aspect when a situational cue makes it salient — activating a defensive response that competes with the very task or belief-revision the situation demands, and wins often enough to leave measurable costs.
• IKEA Effect — The bias in which people value objects they built themselves above identical objects built by others — triggered specifically by successful non-trivial creator-labour, visible only in the creator's own valuation, and gone for third parties.
• Illusory Superiority — The aggregate finding that a clear majority of people place themselves above their reference group's median on desirable traits — mathematically impossible — because unconstrained self-rating shifts each person slightly upward until the summed biases overflow the distributional ceiling.
• Implicit Egotism — Transfer an agent's default positive evaluation of self to otherwise neutral targets linked to that self — names, birthday digits, possessions, places, or roles — so association alone tilts preference without deliberate self-reference.
• Impostor Syndrome — The pattern in which a demonstrably capable, externally-validated person keeps a private conviction that their competence is fake, because a non-updating self-assessment channel rereads each new success as proof the deception still works rather than as evidence of ability.
• Impression Management — Shape how an audience evaluates an actor by first deciding which public image is worth pursuing, then selecting, displaying, and suppressing self-relevant cues to construct that impression under the audience's expectations and constraints.
• Introspection Illusion — People overweight felt access to their own reasons and intentions while judging others from behavior, so absence of an introspectable motive is mistaken for absence of that motive or process in oneself.
• Irrelevant speech effect — The finding that serial recall of verbal material is impaired by to-be-ignored background speech — even foreign or reversed — because changing-state speech-like sound gains obligatory, pre-attentive access to the phonological store and competes with the subvocally rehearsed task codes.
• Just-World Hypothesis — People hold a motivated belief that the world is fair; when undeserved suffering they cannot remedy threatens it, they restore the belief by re-perceiving the victim as deserving, producing victim-blaming rather than empathy.
• Kappa effect — A psychophysical illusion in which the perceived duration between two stimuli lengthens when they are farther apart in space and shortens when closer, because the perceptual system reconstructs elapsed time from spatial layout under an implicit constant-velocity prior.
• Kewpie doll effect — The pattern in which a configural set of juvenile features — big cranium, large low-set eyes, small nose and chin — pre-consciously cues the caregiving system, even in non-living entities, so response magnitude tracks how far the configuration exceeds any real infant rather than what the object is.
• Kinetic depth effect — The perceptual recovery of vivid 3D structure from the 2D motion of a stimulus that looks flat when static — the visual system solving an underdetermined inverse problem by adding motion as constraint under a rigidity prior.
• Lady Macbeth effect — A proposed and replication-contested pattern in which contemplating one's own wrongdoing increases the desire for physical cleansing, and cleansing after a transgression reduces the felt need for moral repair — as if the brain conflates moral and physical purity through a shared schema.
• Levels-of-Processing Effect — The memory finding that the encoding operation applied to a stimulus — shallow structural, phonemic, or deep semantic — not time on task or intent to learn, determines the strength and durability of the resulting trace, via elaboration and distinctiveness.
• Mandela Effect — The phenomenon of shared false memories — many people independently recalling the same wrong detail — explained not by coordination or the paranormal but by schema-driven reconstructive memory running in parallel, so convergence without a communication channel is exactly what gist-over-verbatim coding predicts.
• Martha Mitchell effect — Diagnose the trap in which an evaluator discounts a true but improbable report as delusional purely on its low prior probability, never testing whether its external referent is real.
• McGurk effect — Show that speech perception is intrinsically multimodal: a face articulating /ga/ over an audio /ba/ is heard as /da/, because the auditory and visual streams are fused into a single percept — by reliability-weighted, coherence-gated combination — before the result reaches awareness.
• Means-End Analysis — A greedy problem-solving heuristic that repeatedly finds the most significant difference between the current and goal states, applies the operator that most reduces it, and recurses on any unmet preconditions as sub-goals.
• Mental Rotation — The cognitive process of imagining an object rotating continuously through intermediate orientations to align it with a comparison object before judging a match — diagnosed by reaction time that scales linearly with angular disparity.
• Mere Ownership Effect — The finding that merely possessing an object — even briefly, even when assigned at random — raises a person's evaluation of it, because the self's positive bias transfers to whatever gets tagged 'mine' ('mine is good because I am good').
• Miller's Law (7 ± 2) — Miller's finding that immediate human recall is capped at a small integer of chunks (~7, later corrected nearer four) — separating a bounded item count from unbounded content per item, so the only way to hold more is to recode the unit, not widen the channel.
• Misinformation Effect — The memory phenomenon in which information encountered after an event is silently integrated into the recollection of that event — a source-monitoring failure of reconstructive memory that produces confident, sincere recall of things that did not happen.
• Money Illusion — The tendency to respond to nominal monetary figures as if they were real, inflation-adjusted amounts — failing to apply the purchasing-power deflator — so behavior tracks the observed nominal quantity over the real one it should weigh.
• Munchausen Syndrome — The clinical pattern (DSM-5 factitious disorder imposed on self) in which a person deliberately feigns, fabricates, or self-induces medical symptoms with no external material reward, in order to occupy the valued role of the sick person — with a by-proxy variant enacted on a dependent.
• Myelination — The process by which glial cells wrap insulating myelin around axons, forcing action potentials to jump between nodes of Ranvier (saltatory conduction) — raising conduction velocity an order of magnitude and cutting metabolic cost per spike, so conduction speed becomes the common variable behind milestones and demyelinating disease.
• Naive Realism — Explain intractable disagreement as the converging conviction that one perceives the world directly, that all rational observers would agree, and that dissenters must be biased — relocating the dispute from the facts to each party's invisible construction of them.
• Name-Letter Effect — Measure implicit self-positivity by the small, aggregate-only elevation in how much people like their own name-letters on a task framed as purely aesthetic and not cued to the self — a proxy that vanishes the instant self-relevance is made salient.
• Near-Miss Effect — The operant finding that an outcome falling just short of the target — though it pays exactly zero — sustains responding more than a clearly distant failure, because the internal reinforcement signal is weighted by counterfactual proximity to the goal rather than by actual payoff.
• Negativity Bias — Weight a psychological impact function asymmetrically around zero so that negative stimuli, events, and information claim disproportionately more attention, memory, and motivational pull than equally intense positive ones, at a stable offset ratio commonly running several-to-one.
• Novelty Effect — Recognise that a newly introduced stimulus draws an elevated response tied to its recency, not its intrinsic worth, which decays near-exponentially toward a steady-state baseline — so short-window evaluation systematically over-estimates the intervention's lasting effect.
• Ostrich Effect — The pattern in which an agent actively avoids acquiring freely available, decision-relevant information whose expected content is bad news, because the anticipated affective cost of knowing outweighs the benefit of acting — so information acquisition becomes valence-sensitive rather than monotone in decision value.
• Overjustification Effect — The pattern where a salient external reward for an already-intrinsically-motivated activity makes the agent reattribute their motive to the reward, so that when the reward stops, activity falls below its pre-reward baseline — a crowding-out, not an augmenting, of motivation.
• Peak-end rule — Predict the remembered value of an extended experience from just two moments — its most intense point and its final moment, averaged — while the duration and the integral of momentary affect over the interior receive near-zero weight.
• Perceptual Constancy — The phenomenon by which a perceiver holds an object's properties — size, shape, color, identity — stable despite large variation in the proximal stimulus, by inferring the distal property and implicitly factoring out the viewing condition.
• Perceptual Set — Explain how prior expectation, context, motivation, or expertise biases what is perceived from ambiguous or degraded input — the percept is the prior weighted by how decisive the sensory evidence is, so the expectation dominates precisely when the stimulus underdetermines it.
• Peripheral Route Processing — The Elaboration Likelihood Model's low-elaboration pathway in which limited motivation or ability makes surface cues such as apparent expertise, attractiveness, message length, familiarity, and affect carry persuasion, producing attitude change that is cheap to acquire but comparatively labile.
• Picture superiority effect — Pictures are remembered substantially better than the words naming the same referents because a picture is typically encoded in two independent codes — visual and verbal — whose retrieval routes OR-aggregate, while a word engages only the verbal route.
• Positivity Effect — The age-graded shift in attention and memory toward positive and away from negative information, driven not by chronological age but by a narrowing perceived time horizon that re-weights goals — a goal-driven, load-sensitive strategy, not a passive decline.
• Possibility Effect — People systematically overweight very small probabilities in risky choice, because crossing from impossible to barely-possible is a categorical shift in how an outcome is represented — the steep small-p branch of prospect theory's inverse-S weighting function.
• Pratfall Effect — A small, recoverable blunder raises observers' liking for an agent already judged highly competent — humanizing them by narrowing a status gap — while the same blunder lowers liking for a mediocre agent, so the impression update reverses sign depending on the prior competence estimate.
• Precedence Effect — When two copies of a sound arrive within a short critical window (~1–40 ms), the auditory system localizes the fused percept entirely by the first-arriving wavefront and discounts the lagging copy's spatial claim, while still letting it contribute to loudness and timbre.
• Predictive Remapping — Explain trans-saccadic visual stability by having visuospatial neurons shift their receptive fields to a stimulus's future post-saccadic retinal position before the eyes move — driven by an efference copy of the saccade command, so the eyes land on an already-built representation.
• Primacy Effect — Items at the beginning of a sequence are remembered and weighted disproportionately, through two converging mechanisms — extra rehearsal cycles in serial recall and interpretive frame-setting in impression formation — so that the same content in different orders yields different beliefs.
• Probability Weighting Function — Transform objective or stated probabilities into subjective decision weights, typically overweighting small probabilities, underweighting middle and high probabilities, and treating the zero and certainty boundaries nonlinearly.
• Problem-Solving Fixation — A familiar representation of a problem, method, or object becomes the first and dominant retrieval path, suppressing alternatives that the solver could otherwise use and producing an avoidable failure that can be relieved by disrupting the representation rather than adding knowledge.
• Psychophysical Scaling — Relate controlled changes in measurable physical stimulation to changes in sensation or discrimination by fitting a modality-specific response law over an explicitly bounded operating range.
• Recency Effect — The empirical finding that the last items in a temporal sequence are recalled or weighted more heavily than middle items, driven by a short-term-store component and a temporal-distinctiveness component that a filled delay can separate.
• Reconstructive Memory — Rebuild a remembered event at retrieval from incomplete traces, learned schemas, present cues, and later information rather than replaying a fixed record, so recall can remain coherent while its details, sources, and timing change.
• Representativeness Heuristic — Judge how probable, frequent, or generatively plausible an outcome is by how closely it resembles a category prototype or expected process pattern, so typicality silently replaces the target quantity and becomes systematically misleading when base rates, sample size, or set inclusion disagree.
• Retrieval Practice — Actively recalling information from memory produces stronger, more durable retention than an equivalent period of re-studying, because the effortful generative act of producing a target from a cue reconstructs and strengthens the memory trace more than passive re-exposure does.
• Retrieval-Induced Forgetting — Recast retrieval as a selection operation in a competitive field: actively recalling some items from a shared-cue set inhibits the related-but-unretrieved competitors, leaving them measurably less recallable than if nothing had been practiced at all.
• Scope Neglect — Explain why elicited valuations stay flat across hundredfold changes in magnitude — the count is replaced by a single affect-laden prototype, so the number is understood but never priced in.
• Script Activation — Trigger, from a single environmental or linguistic cue, the loading of a stored ordered event sequence with role and prop slots and default fillers, which then gap-fills comprehension, pre-allocates processing, and scaffolds action at once.
• Self-Reference Effect — The memory phenomenon in which material encoded in relation to the self is recalled at higher rates than material encoded semantically, phonemically, or structurally — driven by the richness of the self-schema, so any comparably elaborated schema yields the same advantage.
• Self-Serving Bias — The directional asymmetry by which agents credit their own successes to internal factors (ability, effort) and blame failures on external ones (luck, circumstance) to protect self-image — making any self-report about one's own outcome a biased evidence class with a known lean.
• Sequential Clarity — Judge how well each item in an ordered presentation stands out not by its own quality but by how much it contrasts with its immediate temporal neighbours inside the working-memory window.
• Sequential Compliance Technique — A requester deliberately stages an initial request or response-producing interaction so that its acceptance, refusal, or apparent concession changes the target's state and raises compliance with a later target request above the rate the later request would obtain alone.
• Serial-Position Effect — The memory phenomenon in which items in a sequence are recalled in a U-shaped curve — high for the beginning (primacy, from extra rehearsal) and end (recency, from the transient buffer), sagging in the middle — with the two limbs mechanistically dissociable.
• Simon Effect — Explain why responses are faster when a stimulus's task-irrelevant spatial location matches the response side: the perceptual system pre-attentively generates a same-side response code that facilitates selection when it agrees with the task-mandated code and costs ~30 ms when it conflicts.
• Situated Cognition — Hold that knowing and skilled performance are constitutively of their situation — distributed across agent, tools, and setting — not a context-free program the situation merely modulates, forcing a constitutive-versus-causal test on any competence.
• Situated Learning — Treat competence as something formed and recognised inside a community of practice rather than transferred through a curriculum, so a novice learns by doing real low-stakes work at the periphery and deepening toward the centre as the community recognises their growing skill.
• Sleeper Effect — Explain why a message paired with a discounting cue can grow more persuasive over weeks: the persuasive content and the cue that braked it are stored as separate memory traces that decay at different rates, so when the cue fades faster the net persuasion inverts sign at delayed recall.
• Social Bonding — Explain why affectively capable individuals keep routing help and protection toward one another long after any incentive would predict it: repeated shared experience and emotional co-regulation forge a durable bond that generates behaviour above and orthogonal to current incentives.
• Spatial Updating — Keep the surrounding layout accurate as you move by integrating self-motion signals into an estimate of how your viewpoint has changed and applying that transformation to every stored object location, no fresh look required.
• Spotlight Effect — Explain the felt certainty that everyone noticed as an estimation error: the actor anchors on how salient a self-feature is from the inside and under-corrects toward observers' far lower base-rate attention, so predicted notice runs about double the actual.
• State-Dependent Learning — The memory phenomenon in which material encoded in one internal physiological or psychological state is retrieved more reliably when the agent is again in a matching state — because the body's condition at learning is bound into the trace as part of the encoding context — diagnosed by a crossover interaction where matched states beat mismatched ones.
• Status Quo Bias — Model the systematic over-choosing of whatever option is framed as current — the same two alternatives chosen at different rates depending only on which is the default — as a content-independent departure surcharge built from loss aversion, regret aversion, and decision cost.
• Status Quo Trap — Frame status quo bias as a named trap a single deliberating actor can counter: recognise that the current course wins only because the switch must be defended while the staying is not, then run the fresh-start counterfactual that forces it to compete on its merits.
• Stevens's Power Law — Relate the perceived magnitude of a sensation to the physical intensity of the stimulus by a power function ψ = k·I^β, whose modality-characteristic exponent β compresses the sense (β < 1), expands it (β > 1), or leaves it near-linear — recovered as the slope of magnitude estimates plotted on log-log axes.
• Stimulus–Response Compatibility — When a stimulus automatically activates a response code, performance improves if that code agrees with the task-mandated response and degrades if the codes conflict, even when the triggering feature is irrelevant.
• Stroop Effect — Measure cognitive control by the extra time and errors it costs to name a color word's ink when the word disagrees — a competition between an over-trained automatic pathway and a weaker task-relevant one, resolved by top-down inhibition.
• Subadditivity Effect — Diagnose why the judged probability of an event named as a whole comes in reliably below the sum of judged probabilities for its named parts — because unpacking recruits more cognitive support — reading the known upward sign off which figure was solicited packed versus partitioned.
• Subject-Expectancy Effect — Treat a participant's beliefs about an intervention as a genuine driver of their reported and physiological responses, so any unblinded measurement confounds the manipulation with anticipation until blinding, placebo control, or a balanced-placebo design pulls the two apart.
• Surrogation — Explain why a well-designed metric drifts from its purpose even absent any gaming: under load an accountable manager mentally replaces the strategic construct with its measure, treating the number as the thing itself rather than a partial proxy for it.
• Tamagotchi Effect — Explain why people form real emotional attachment to artificial entities they know aren't alive: a care-requesting cue bundle plus a recurring maintenance demand engages the human caregiving instinct, producing attachment disproportionate to the object's realism.
• Task-Switching Cost — Isolate the performance penalty paid at the moment of changing between rule-sets — separate from either task's steady-state difficulty — by contrasting switch trials against repeat trials in the same mixed block, and split it into a preparation-reducible part and an irreducible residual.
• Telescoping Effect — Distort the felt timing of remembered events because memory stores no timestamps and reconstructs a date from retrieval-cue richness — so vivid, salient events feel more recent than they were (forward telescoping) and monotonous stretches feel more distant.
• Temporal Binding — Bind events that fall within a characteristic time window into a single perceived unit by attributing them to a shared source, warping subjective time and location to keep the percept consistent with that attribution.
• Temporal Distinctiveness — Predict an item's recallability not from its absolute age but from how isolated it is among its neighbours in a log-compressed, retrieval-end view of the past, governed by the ratio of the retention interval to the inter-item interval.
• Tetris Effect — The involuntary persistence of patterns from a recently, intensively practised activity into perception, imagery, and dreams — memory consolidation replaying strongly encoded content through a non-declarative pathway as a side-channel of skill learning.
• Thatcher Effect — A face with locally inverted eyes and mouth looks grotesque upright but unremarkable upside down, because the holistic configural system that reads inter-feature relations fires only near canonical upright orientation — a switch that lets the effect probe whether that system is engaged and intact.
• Uncanny Valley — Human affinity for a human-like artefact does not rise steadily with realism but climbs, then plunges into a valley of unease in the narrow almost-human band, and recovers only when realism reads as genuinely human — because near-human stimuli recruit human-specific recognition routines that flag the remaining mismatches.
• Ventriloquism Effect — A sound is mislocalised toward a synchronised visual event when the brain infers a common cause, because vision's lower spatial uncertainty pulls the merged location estimate toward it by inverse-variance weighting — gated by temporal and spatial binding windows beyond which the percept splits.
• Venus Effect — Viewers of a depicted figure at a mirror wrongly infer she sees her own reflection, because they treat the mirror as returning one fixed image to everyone rather than reflecting along a viewer-dependent sight-line — so a self-regarding scene the geometry forbids is accepted without objection.
• Von Restorff Effect — An item that departs from the pattern of its surrounding context is recalled far more reliably than its neighbours, because memory is contrast-sensitive rather than absolute — the boost is a function of departure from the local norm, not of the item's intrinsic properties.
• Wagon-Wheel Effect — A rapidly spinning spoked wheel appears to slow, freeze, or reverse because a periodic feature sampled at discrete intervals above its Nyquist limit produces a lower-frequency alias — the apparent motion being the slowest rotation consistent with the snapshots, not the true speed.
• Weber's Law — The just-noticeable difference in a stimulus is a constant fraction of the baseline magnitude, not a fixed absolute amount (ΔI/I = k), so a perceiving system compares ratios rather than differences across its dynamic range.
• Well-Travelled Road Effect — People underestimate the duration of familiar routes and overestimate equally long unfamiliar ones, because retrospective duration is reconstructed from the count of distinct, attention-demanding event traces memory retained — few for automatic familiar travel, many for novel decision-dense travel.
• Werther Effect — The measured rise in suicide rates in the weeks after a publicised suicide, driven by media-modelled behaviour and gated by how closely the at-risk audience identifies with the case, with a sign-flipped protective complement when coverage models recovery instead.
• Westermarck Effect — The evolved incest-avoidance mechanism in which people raised in close domestic proximity during the first six years develop a lasting adult sexual aversion to one another — tracking early co-residence as a proxy for kinship, not biological relatedness itself.
• Word Frequency Effect — The robust finding that high-frequency words are recognised faster and more accurately than low-frequency ones, because lexical access is a graded, exposure-keyed threshold — retrieval speed falling roughly with the logarithm of a word's lifetime corpus frequency for that reader.
• Word Superiority Effect — The finding that a target letter is identified faster and more accurately inside a familiar word than in a non-word or alone, because an activated lexical whole feeds activation back down to its constituent letters within the stimulus window.
• Working Memory — Maintain a small, short-lived set of representations in an actively accessible workspace whose executive control can select, rehearse, transform, replace, and coordinate them for the task currently being performed.
• Working Memory Capacity — The finite quantity of information a person can hold actively available for simultaneous manipulation — a small chunk-counted budget distinct from long-term and sensory memory — sized as supply against a task's demand, and attackable by chunking, offloading, or sequencing.
• Working-Memory Updating — The executive function of monitoring a capacity-limited short-term store and revising its contents in real time — adding, replacing, transforming, and evicting items by relevance to the current task, distinct from passively maintaining them.
• Worse-than-Average Effect — The reversal of self-enhancement on hard, expert-dominated tasks, where most people rate themselves below average because self-ratings anchor on one's own absolute perceived skill and ignore the distribution of others — the sign of the bias set by perceived task difficulty.
• Yerkes–Dodson Law — The finding that task performance improves with arousal up to an interior optimum then deteriorates — an inverted-U whose peak sits at lower arousal for complex tasks and higher for simple ones, so under- and over-arousal are opposite failures needing opposite fixes.
• Zeigarnik Effect — The finding that interrupted or unfinished tasks are recalled better than completed ones, because beginning a task installs a persisting goal-tension that keeps its representation activated until completion discharges it — scaled by goal-importance and gated on the interruption reading as a pause.